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The miser whose treasure has been taken from him. It is some of the frozen past which he has
lost. Past and future, man’s only riches.
Gravity and Grace, Simone Weil

Therefore this and any other case of desire is desire for something which is inaccessible and
absent. If there’s you need, miss, or lack, then that’s the kind of thing you can desire and love.
Yes?
Symposium, Plato
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Introduction
––––––––––––––––––

What is Desire?

Even before T.S. Eliot could view Dante as an authority on the religious life, he saw him
as his poetic master. He claimed that “more can be learned about how to write poetry from Dante
than any other English poet” (712). What was it to be “learned”? Though Eliot explicates
Dante’s literary merits at length, praising the Inferno for its vividness of image and simplicity of
language, Dante’s metaphysics of desire was foundational to the formation of Eliot’s own
thought and poetics, both before and after his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism in 1927.
“Purgatorio 15” makes the distinction between spiritual desires and material desires:
For when your longings center on things such
that sharing them apportions less to each,
then envy stirs the bellows of your sighs.
But if the love within the Highest Sphere
should turn your longings heavenward, the fear
inhabiting your breast would disappear. (Purg. 15.49-54)
The language of “longing” and “love” are used between these two stanzas to describe the
discrepancy between finite objects of desire and the inexhaustible desire for the “Highest
Sphere.” When finite objects of “longing” are scarce a competition arises that corrupts desire.
Worldly desire is thus isolating and jealous, sustained in a continually shrinking echo chamber of
“envy.” Desire restricted to the material world contracts upon satiation and resists connectivity;
if it is shared, it inspires envy, yet if it is not shared, it is selfish. Spiritual desire, the redirection
of “your longings heavenward,” is unbound and flourishes when shared: “And when there are
more souls above who love, / There’s more to love well there, and they love more, / and, mirror-
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like, each soul reflects the other” (Purg. 15.73-75). Divine love and spiritual “longings,” the act
of redirecting horizontal desires vertically, multiplies “love,” mirroring it in others as it is
mirrored in the self. The spiritual object of desire expands while the “envy” and “fear” of
material desire “disappears.”
What, then, does this mean for Eliot? Though Eliot did not assent to Dante’s
metaphysical schema early in his career, the problem of desire haunted much of his poetics and
thought. Whether the vision of desire’s heavenly multiplication or its inverse, its material
division, Eliot explored desire and its discontents both before and after his conversion. As a
young poet he dramatized the modern’s distance from the ideal of “love within the Highest
Sphere,” emphasizing both the sense of emptiness and the depravity in material desires.
The emptiness in a poem like “Portrait of a Lady” is demonstrative of the material desires
warned against in “Purgatorio.” It captures the potential for isolation in emotional intimacy; the
insurmountable distance between two figures’ disparate desires is measured by a failed
friendship. An elderly woman attempts to forge a relationship with a younger man, but as her
unreciprocated object of desire, he is utterly estranged from her attempts. She tries to establish a
rapport of cultural affinity, playing him Chopin, but “Inside [his] brain a dull tom-tom begins /
Absurdly hammering a prelude of its own” (“Portrait of a Lady”). The poem explores the
incongruity between the two figures’ desires and how, in their interaction, the sharing
“apportions less to each” (Purg. 15.50). The conflict of their disparate desires begets a sense of
emptiness not dissimilar from Virgilio’s characterization of material desire begetting a state of
muted despair, one that “stirs the bellows of your sighs” (Purg. 15.51).
But their mutual misunderstanding yields to a deeper problem. The young man cannot
even name his own desires. Sitting in a park and listening to “some worn-out common song,”
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smelling the hyacinths, he recalls “things that other people have desired. / Are these ideas right
or wrong?” (“Portrait of a Lady”). He cannot identify desirable objects spontaneously; they only
appear to him in mediated form, as “things… desired” by “other people.” Recalling René
Girard’s theory of “mimetic desire,” the theory that desire for an object is always indirect and
modeled off another’s desire, the speaker of the poem finds his own internal life lacking, and he
thus searches for models to try and triangulate his desires with. There is a sense that his own
value system is fundamentally unstable and his desires, thereby, unknowable. The abstract
question of “right” and “wrong” is a deep problem for modern desire. Though he retreats to the
inward space, there are no depths of emotion -- only a vacuity of obsolete models. Rather than
finding solace from the confusion of social life, he hears a “dull tom-tom” in lieu of Chopin and
the mechanical fatigue of the song in the park exacerbates his own mechanical fatigue.
Musicality inspires inwardness and contemplation—this is not a strange paradigm—but nothing
is found beneath the upper firmament of consciousness but a sense of vacancy. The poem is thus
not spiritually febrile; it simply has no vocabulary for imagining desire under terms other than its
own, and further, the speaker does not even possess the capacity to desire. The faculty of desire
is utterly depleted of energy, whether it be material or spiritual.
What exactly happens to desire in the age of secular modernity? “Portrait of a Lady,” in
many ways, captures Eliot’s primary concerns with modern desire. The problem of lifeless
longing looms over the poem, and is ultimately not resolved within its own space. Jose Casanova
identifies the secular as a “central modern epistemic category,” claiming that secularities are
“codified, institutionalized, and experienced in various modern contexts and they parallel
correlated transformations of modern ‘religiosities’ and ‘spiritualities.’” The secular is what
Charles Taylor calls the “immanent frame.” In A Secular Age it “constitutes a ‘natural’ order, to
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be contrasted to a ‘supernatural’ one, an ‘immanent’ world, over against a possible
‘transcendent’ one” (542). Though Eliot uses Dante as a model, his approaches to desire
ultimately exist within this “immanent frame.”
In order to understand why Eliot used Dante as his metaphysical model, it is important to
understand how desire functions in the “immanent frame.” Eugene Goodheart makes the useful
distinction between desire within a religious imagination versus desire within a secular
imagination:
Desire exists beyond need. Need is determinate, it demands and achieves satisfaction: it
expresses man’s animal nature. Desire is a “spiritual” energy; it represents” the
indefinable in human life. In a religious sense, it has as its object identification with the
will of God. Desire does not disappear with the disappearance of God, but becomes
necessarily insatiable… Only a God worthy of devotion could chasten desire and make it
satiable. “Modern” desire persists in the wake of the disappearance of God. (3)
While religious desire forges an ultimate “object identification with the will of God,” secular
desire does not have a preeminent object to identify itself with. The “disappearance of God”
means the disappearance of an ultimate object. Secular desire can be seen as fragmented,
creating an array of disparate objects to become attached to rather than a single absolute. Desire
for a single object became desires. Figures within Eliot’s poems are often fixated on an object of
desire that is either unfulfilling or unfulfillable. The poems frequently portray figures
undertaking a search for an object of desire, and thus describe a condition in which desire longs
to desire, or to discover an object worthy of desire as such. This is exemplified in the dizzying
confusion of aimless desires in “Prufrock” and “Gerontion”; deprived of viable historical models
for action, neither of them can discern any suitable objects of desire. These distilled voices are
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extended into moments in The Waste Land: “What shall we do tomorrow? / What shall we ever
do?” It is even further addressed in what is sometimes considered Eliot’s most mature poem,
“Burnt Norton”: “Over the strained time-ridden faces / Distracted from distraction by
distraction.” Desire, subject to distraction, begins to digest itself. Secular desire exists in a selfbegetting cycle. There is no satiation in secular desire’s rotation of objects it can attach itself to.
But religious desire, in its boundless love for God, is inexhaustible. Goodheart is making the
claim that the operations of religious desire do not disappear with the “disappearance of God,”
but are folded in and assimilated into secular desire under modern terminology. For Goodheart,
whether desire is religious or secular, it is a “spiritual energy.”
Though he calls the order of secular desire into question by using a medieval metaphysics
as his model, Eliot is, by virtue of being a modernist, ultimately subject to the conditions of
secular desire. It is, however, these moral and spiritual boundaries that he is struggling against.
In this project I will be examining the nexus of desires in Eliot’s literary criticism and poetry
prior to his conversion, exploring the struggles of the formation of Eliot’s religious sensibility
through the lens of desire. Beginning with Eliot’s theories on culture and the “dissociation of
sensibility,” I will map the coordinates of the desire lurking behind the demands he places upon
the modern poet, the emotional life, and the cultural landscape. This will then be placed into
conversation with “The Love Song of Alfred J. Prufrock” and “Gerontion,” exploring the ways
in which Eliot’s cultural concerns compliment, and are even challenged by his poetics. In my
second chapter I examine the taxonomic shift from cultural desire to spiritual desire between
Eliot’s first two collections of poetry, Prufrock and Other Observations and Poems: 1920, to The
Waste Land. I argue that, though The Waste Land is sometimes interpreted as a document of
cultural decay and even of modern atheism, the poem is fundamentally ascetic. In its attempts to
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reorient desire beyond what Taylor calls the “immanent frame,” spiritual desire is probed
through an apophatic discourse, using examples of debased desires in order to illuminate images
that work towards the realm of, in Dante’s words, “love within the Highest Sphere.” The poem
works through the spiritual and moral problematics that ultimately culminate in the conversion.
Finally, through this hermeneutic of desire, I will establish the beginning of a groundwork for
ways to read Eliot’s consummate work, the Four Quartets. The Quartets, due to their musicality
and devotional nature, have a way of resisting stringent interpretation. Perhaps this is a symptom
of the very desires that occupy the text and their esotericism, or perhaps I have been moved by
the Quartets a few too many times, but think of the work I have done here as a step—maybe one
of many—in grappling with the Four Quartets.The secular desire of Eliot’s early work may be,
in Goodheart’s words, “insatiable”; however, the desire of the Four Quartets that begins its
articulation in The Waste Land is ultimately inexhaustible.
***
Desire, in all moments, is engaged in a type of struggle. It is a spatio-temporal system
occurring in the present, while projecting yearning, emotion, and other metaphysical energies
into an ever-receding horizon line. Considering secular desire: once the object of desire is
attained, or the horizon line is approached, another horizon, or object, is inevitably born. Secular
desire is sustained by its own system, which is ultimately a system of despair. Desire becomes
momentarily attached to an object, but is constantly retreating to find new objects. Under these
rotational terms, desire may never be fulfilled. What, however, occurs if the rules of this
temporal system—the structure of the horizon line or the general approach to it—are violated?
This may take the form of contemplation of the object rather than efforts at its attainment, or
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perhaps an acknowledgement that the object can never truly be “attained.” It also, perhaps more
likely, may be a change in what the very object of desire is.
Eliot’s religious disposition offered a new form for imagining desire. In a letter to Paul
Elmore More, a Christian humanist, Eliot wrote that those without a religious instinct seem:
to be unconscious of any void—the void that I find in the middle of all human happiness
and all human relations, and which there is only one thing to fill. I am one whom this
sense of the void tends to drive towards asceticism or sensuality, and only Christianity
helps to reconcile me to life, which is otherwise disgusting. (Letters)
Eliot was certainly conscious of “the void” through the whole of his career, but it is in his
Christian sensibility that he finds some reconciliation in dealing with it. The “void,” for Eliot,
was present before, but it was articulated under different terms. Prior to it being imbued with
religious significance, the void he found “in the middle of all human happiness and all human
relations” was bound up with Emile Durkheim’s concept of anomie. Durkheim developed his
theory of the anomic condition in his study Suicide, in which he ascribes a cultural causality to
the psychological state of modern aimlessness. The etymology of anomie stems from the Greek
word for “lawlessness”: to be a-nomos, or without law governing human conduct. Anomie is a
mass portrait of the individual disembedded from the social fabric within a culture unable to
uphold a robust system of values. Durkheim described anomie as an “insatiable will,” and the
“malady of the infinite” because the desire for guiding principles under the anomic state can
never be fulfilled, and therefore they can only become more intense. The individual’s
estrangement from a system of values is certainly a void in what Eliot calls “human happiness,”
but it is also a void in desire. The void is further augmented in desire becoming more intense
while its objects become more remote. How can desire be a fulfilling faculty if its objects are
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“infinite”? This form of secular desire is defined as a “malady” by Durkheim, or a spiritual
disease. If we are to think of it in terms of sickness, The Waste Land is a search for the cure to
such a spiritual disease: Eliot manages to fold the cultural problems he is concerned with in his
early work into a poetic quarrel with the spiritual, re-organizing desire to non-material ends.
Early in Eliot’s career, he did not yet possess the religious vocabulary to identify the
“void” in the cultural landscape. Regardless, he was attentive to the sense of absence in the
modern. Durkheim’s characterization of “insatiable will” has strong resonances with
Goodheart’s theory of secular desire as “necessarily insatiable.” The crux of both their arguments
characterizes modern desire by its impossibility of finding fulfillment. Both thinkers represent
secular desires through the excess in objects it can become attached to, but I would like to draw
attention to what happens to desire when it loses a robust normative framework and becomes
anomic. What would it mean to recognize the void in all “human relationships and all human
happiness” without any moral redemption? Eliot’s own thought became radically reoriented
towards different ends after, and even before, his conversion. The religious instinct drove him
towards “asceticism and sensuality,” providing intelligibility to his suffering. In the same letter
to More, Eliot wrote: Eliot steeps his religious sensibility in the ascetic tradition, aligning it with
the “dark night” of St. John of the Cross’s Dark Night of the Soul, and the desert, the canonical
site of withdrawal. Religion, for Eliot, provides a sense of satiation in the knowledge that desire
is fundamentally insatiable, and thus it is not the disappointment of worldly desires that Eliot is
referring to, like that of the “insatiable will,” but a “pain” and “misery” that are generative and
perhaps even sacramental.
Eliot’s professed attraction to “asceticism and sensuality” is probed in his earlier poetry.
Though the pairing had not fully come into articulation in the way it does in Eliot’s letters to
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More, he continually investigates their relationship. “The Love Song of Saint Sebastian” portrays
the despotism of material desire, melding the categories of the ascetic and the sensual in a
manner that is, without the reconciliation of religious morality, sadomasochistic. This poem
recasts the vita of Saint Sebastian, and in the process, desire is recast, as well. The historical
Saint Sebastian’s martyrdom is positioned at the intersection of the temporal and the eternal, but
his story has exegetically been imagined as embodying the pleasure in pain, and vice versa;
thereby lending itself to secular interpretation. The highly erotic imagery of arrows puncturing
his skin has over time forged an association between Sebastian and homo-eroticism. The meeting
of desire for God and erotic desire is thus dramatized in his martyrdom. Eliot taps into these
symbolic associations in the “Love Song”; playing up the exegetical strains, while exaggerating
the distance between the historical Saint Sebastian and the Saint Sebastian of the poem. The
poem is addressed to a “you,” but the object of love, in being attached to another human, is
finite. Both narratives of Saint Sebastian are of gratuitous violence; however, for the Sebastian of
the poem, there is no transformative quality to the pain. His physicality does not serve a purpose
beyond its own ends of self-satisfaction. The speaker traverses the territory of ascetic practice—
he wears a “shirt of hair” and claims to “flog” himself—but his devotional actions are attached to
erotic desire, deriving both “torture” and “delight.” In being restricted to lust, Saint Sebastian’s
actions do not, however, move beyond himself. His asceticism is represented as if it is sacrificial,
yet it is unclear if the “you” has any interest in the sacrifices, or if his “Love Song” warrants
these actions. Eliot’s Saint Sebastian goes through the motions of ascetic practice, but he
ultimately does not discipline his desire, existing in a state of superfluous sensuality. The Saint
Sebastian of the poem is thereby characterized by debilitating lust.
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The Dantean “envy” that Guido del Duca posits, that material desire gives way to desire’s
diminishment, is dramatized to the utmost extreme in this poem: “And I should love you the
more because I mangled you / And because you were no longer beautiful / To anyone but me”
(“The Love Song of Saint Sebastian”). This poem possesses the vocabulary of the religious
imagination, but it does not implement it. Further, it understands the “negative” and the
“apophatic” qualities of religious desire, but it is only able to represent them through selfabasement and destruction. In mapping the physicality of suffering and desire onto the secular,
the actions become tinged with horror. According to the pilgrim of “Purgatorio,” worldly objects
of desire are diminished upon satiation, inspiring “envy,” but Eliot parodies this sentiment. The
object of desire does not merely contract, but is tortured and terminated. Saint Sebastian attempts
to claim sovereignty over his object of desire, but in his object being human, he “mangles” her.
The desirous momentum of the “Love Song” resembles the energy with which one devotes
themselves to faith, but it is filtered into a tyrannical, erotic desire, thus making the very faculty
grotesque. Despite the language of the poem, the sacramentality of suffering is made obsolete.
In the pages that follow I will attempt to trace the progression of Eliot’s orientation
towards desire. Beginning with the limited conception of desire as being tethered to the temporal
world, and moving into a vision of desire in which the desire for a normative culture is
assimilated into spiritual desire. I acknowledge the desires of The Waste Land are not
synonymous with the ascetic desire in Eliot’s letters with More, but The Waste Land is precisely
a struggle towards a metaphysical system. Desire, in all its form, is made manifest throughout
Eliot’s works: the tragic implications, as well as the breadth of possibilities that desire can give
way to. The problem of desire figures prominently in Eliot’s thought, and, though I am thinking
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primarily in the categories of the spiritual and the material, or the religious and the secular,
Eliot’s position within these dichotomies is not absolute.
The language of desire is necessarily capricious; it constantly shifts depending on the
subject-object relationship at stake. The object-identification of desire can vastly change its
charge, and ultimately, it does not always give way to a total coherence. This is, however, an
occupational hazard of investigating Eliot’s relationship to that which is, in Goodheart’s words, a
“spiritual” energy” that represents “the indefinable in human life.” Whether it be material, moral,
or spiritual, desire is contingent upon a struggle. The kind of struggle Eliot was involved in—
what he was struggling towards and against—shifted throughout his career. With the formation
of his religious sensibility, the nature of the objects, as well as how he understood himself to be
interacting with them, shifted. This certainly correlates to Eliot’s conversion to AngloCatholicism, but the moment of conversion is ultimately not a marker of belief and disbelief.
These categories are slippery, and ultimately inconsequential to my polemical purposes.
Ultimately I would like to argue that Eliot’s turn to religion provided a metaphysical order for
desire that was perhaps more important than the actual system of belief. His religious instinct
channeled the despairs of secular desire into “the very dark night and the desert,” offering it a
place to expand, be given meaning beyond “ordinary pain and misery,” and even become
sacramental.
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Chapter One
––––––––––––––––––

The Dissociation and Limited Desire

Secular desire is, and can be, attributed to a vast reservoir of objects. Before Eliot began
to reckon with the moral problems of the modern as spiritual problems, his primary lens was
focused on the cultural and literary landscape. In 1919, Eliot published “Tradition and the
Individual Talent”1 and a few years later, “The Metaphysical Poets.”2 Both of these texts stake a
claim on the modern sensibility by calling for a more unified order through the negative; stating
what is not. Eliot’s continual insistence on re-integration, whether it be in terms of literature, the
moral life, or the wider cultural landscape, is ultimately an expression of desire. As stated, desire
is fundamentally capricious, involved in a continuous cycle of attachment and retreat, but Eliot’s
secular desire for re-integration contains an inexhaustible supply of objects. The massive desire
for re-integration is thus constantly renewed by any semblance of discord, which, in the modern
age, he perceived to be constant. What, then, does it mean for Eliot’s work, particularly in the
early years, to be driven by a desire that, at its foundation, may be insatiable?
To understand Eliot’s unfolding thought about desire, we have to first understand his
theory of the “dissociation of sensibility.” It is perhaps the deepest cultural problem for Eliot, as
a cultural diagnostician and a poet. Eliot first coined the term in an essay he published on “The
Metaphysical Poets” in order to describe what he considered to be the deficiencies in modern
poetic language. The “dissociation of sensibility” names the state and process of the internal

1
2

Here after cited as: Selected Prose, TIT
Here after cited as: Selected Prose, MP
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life’s atomisation, in which, at some point in the seventeenth century, the emotions became
isolated from the intellect and vice versa. In marking the “dissociation” as the moment of rupture
in the internal life, Eliot asks the modern poet to charge emotion with thought and thought with
emotion. While the “dissociation” primarily describes the state of modern literature, many of his
other critical theories follow the same integrative impulse. The typical Eliotic standard follows:
he identifies a brokenness or an absence and addresses it through the rhetoric of, whether
explicitly or not, re-association. Eliot’s consistency in thought to assimilate that which he
understands to be atomised is demonstrative of his underlying desire for unification, which, in
his early years, was limited to culture and the material world. In this chapter I will analyze the
theoretical strains of Eliot’s overarching project in re-unifying the “dissociation of sensibility,”
and how they are made manifest in his early poetics, particularly through “The Love Song of
Alfred J. Prufrock” and “Gerontion.”
Eliot claims there is “a direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of
thought into feeling” in Chapman and Donne. Something, however, occurred in the interim
between Donne and the period following Milton and Dryden: “The sentimental age began early
in the eighteenth century, and continued. The poets revolted against the ratiocinative, the
descriptive” (Selected Prose, MP 63-64). He claims that they “felt by fits, unbalanced.” Eliot
critiques the romantics for dwelling too much in the emotions, suggesting that the balance of
thought and feeling was drowned by the feeling self. Eliot is not making an argument for the
cultural priority of reason, but the swelled sense of self in romanticism is, for Eliot, inimical to
the production of good writing. He repeatedly speaks on the gravity of “significant emotion,”
(Selected Prose, TIT 43) which occurs when the faculties of thought and feeling are not distinct
operations, but inform and are informed by each other. The effort to re-integrate emotion and
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thought into a balanced, unified whole would, for Eliot, create a better poetry and by extension, a
more robust cultural ethos. Eliot’s integrative impulse is the driving energy behind his theory of
the “dissociation,” and in its demands, he embarked on what I will be calling the project of reassociation.
The project of re-association is ultimately not limited to “sensibility.” There is an analogy
to be made between Eliot’s story of the “dissociation of sensibility”—that at some point in the
seventeenth century the interior life became fractured and disorganized—and how he viewed the
modern landscape. Couched within his laments for a unified sensibility are explicit demands he
makes upon the “mind of England” (Selected Prose, MP 64) to re-associate the emotions and the
intellect. Through mapping the singular, internal “dissociation” onto the “mind of England,”
Eliot draws a direct link between the state of culture and civilization. David A. Moody wrote that
if Eliot’s poems become cultural critiques, they do so in order to “give the fullest expression of
the poet’s own mind and feeling” (79). The internal landscape and the external landscape thus
exist in a porous exchange for Eliot. There is an abiding similarity in the way Eliot describes the
dissociated internal life and his vision of modernity. In “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” Eliot calls
culture an “immense panorama of and anarchy which is contemporary history” (Selected Prose,
177). Both the “dissociated sensibility” and the dissociated culture follow the same rhetorical
pattern: that something in the past was, and now due to subtle historical currents, it is now not.
The cultural “futility and anarchy” of modernity has resonances with the literary “fits” of thought
and feeling post-seventeenth century, and in some sense, are of the same concern. The individual
sensibility, the state of literature, and the state of culture, for Eliot, exist in continuous parallels
with each other. Though Eliot’s theory on the “dissociation of sensibility” most explicitly
concerns the individual processing of thought and emotion, the “dissociation” expresses more
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than just the internal life, but can, and frequently is, extended onto the whole of scope of the
modern.
The “dissociation of sensibility” addresses the problem of the imbalance between the
thinking mind and the feeling self and by extension, their excess. Eliot’s theory of the “objective
correlative” is similarly concerned with an excess of emotion in the structure of an art object, and
further, the excess of emotion in the internal life. Eliot first expounds this theory in an essay
entitled “Hamlet and His Problems,” in which he critiques Hamlet as both a literary object and
Hamlet as a literary character.3 Concerning the form of the play, he claims:
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an “objective
correlative”: in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be
the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must
terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. (Selected
Prose, 48)
Eliot emphasizes the importance of “equivalence” in emotion and action in order for the sensory
and the narrative to be linked up in a meaningful way. The artistic problem of Hamlet is that it
lacks a formal symmetry; the sequence of events do not justify the emotions of the play. As the
play is deficient in finding an “objective correlative,” Eliot finds Hamlet’s character to be
“dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they
appear.” His disgust for his mother is a “feeling which he cannot understand; he cannot objectify
it; and it therefore remains to poison life and obstruct action” (48-49). Hamlet is overwhelmed by
an immense, amorphous, and ultimately corrosive feeling, but he is unable to “objectify” it, and

3

Here after cited as: Selected Prose, HHP
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therefore unable to extract himself from it enough to consider it analytically, and by extension,
act. In being over-saturated with feeling, both Hamlet’s emotions and the narrative facts are
obfuscated, which in turn “obstruct[s] action.”
Eliot portrays the state of the modern internal life as utterly ungovernable, but implicit in
his diagnostic of the “dissociation” is the idea of recovery, or re-association. He identifies
modern man as being plagued by his own divided self, thereby urging the “mind of England” to
grasp thought sensuously and feel cerebrally. There is, however, a certain fatalism to Eliot’s
pronouncement that the seventeenth century gave way to a “dissociation of sensibility [that] set
in from which we have never recovered” (Selected Prose, MP 65). A cooperation between
thought and feeling would, for Eliot, lead to a reinvigoration of the senses and poetic language;
but this “cooperation” is a distant, not yet attained model for the organization. In Frank
Kermode’s Romantic Image he describes the reverberations of the doctrine of “dissociation” in
modernist thought, claiming it had “an implicit parallel with the Fall. Man’s soul, since about
1650, had been divided against itself, and it would never be the same again” (167). Through the
parallel of the Fall, the whole “mind of England” is implicated in a collective original sin, some
primeval event in which the mind’s faculties and culture at large became divided; yet implicit in
the Fall is salvation. Kermode’s invocation of the narrative of man’s Fall from grace necessarily
recalls a past prelapsarian vision. The “direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation
of thought into feeling” (Selected Prose, MP 63) that Eliot praises in Chapman and Donne
establishes the qualities of seventeenth century poetry to be the object to strive toward.
Eliot posits a model for the ideal modern mind, but in doing so, he forges a direct lineage
with the past. The rhetoric of progress and the evolution of the “mind of England” is thus placed
under scrutiny. He suggests that the course of culture is not merely a steady accumulation of
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knowledge, but that it is a non-linear, self-reflexive dialogue. The present is then always
conversant with its past. Rather than dwelling on the precipice of historical memory, Eliot uses
the past as a beacon amidst the “futility and anarchy” (Selected Prose “Ulysses, Order, and
Myth,” 177) of the modern. He recalls the seventeenth century as an era in which the internal life
with not divided, using it as a model for how to structure the present. Further, Eliot calls for a
full reckoning with the whole of the western tradition in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” by
suggesting that our predecessors are absolutely integral to the formation of the modern. Eliot
temporally disrupts memory as a linear structure through his construction of the “historical
sense” and the “traditional sensibility”:
The historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its
presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation
in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and
within the whole of literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and
composes a simultaneous order. (38)

Eliot argues that in order to be modern, one must have a robust awareness of history; but further,
like a phantom limb, the past must have a tangible “presence.” He is not, however, asking the
poet to merely maintain memory, but to reanimate it. In this moment Eliot looks admiringly to
the poets of the seventeenth century, and in the same turn asks the modern poet to reintegrate the
“whole of literature” into his own imagination: the prelapsarian vision of the past he posits is
intended to be assimilated into the present. The present moment is not distinctly new or other for
Eliot, but is reliant on the past, forming a “simultaneous existence” and a “simultaneous order”
that the poet can become agent to and conversant with. He creates an imagined literary
community spanning over vast amounts of space and time as an attempt to re-integrate a culture
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dissociated from its own roots. The past and present are constituent to the modern, but their
relationship does not merely run skin deep: It is “in [the poet’s] bones” (38). To merely have an
awareness of history does not make the writer “traditional,” but it is a sense of the “timeless and
the temporal together,” a sense of their deep-seated association. Eliot’s demand for the modern to
reorient the entire scope of cultural time, to assimilate history into the present moment, is in and
of itself a massive, perhaps object-less desire. Eliot identifies objects in the outer-world, yet in
the enormity of their pursuit, they are vast and fleeting.
On a smaller scale, Eliot’s also makes demands for integration in the process of writing
poetry. His characterization of the poet’s mind in the act of writing is not contingent upon
mending that which has been dissociated, but it is still involved in the act of association. He
constructs an image of the ideal mind of the poet in “The Metaphysical Poets,” likening it to a
sieve through which experiences, sense-perceptions, and knowledge are strained and translated
into poetic form. The poet is constantly forming “new wholes,” negotiating a nexus of objects
and placing them into association. Eliot provides an image for what the proper mind looks like
when “it is perfectly equipped for its work”:
It is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man’s experience is
chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two
experiences have nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the
smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new
wholes. (64)

To fall in love or read Spinoza may be altogether separate acts, but if the faculties of thought and
feeling are syncretized, then they are not discrete. In other words, consciousness in all moments
demands an act of integration. Experience is dialectically ordered by synthesizing thought and
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feeling into a new object, or a “new whole.” His call for the poet to be constantly “amalgamating
disparate experiences” resonates with his graduate dissertation, Knowledge and Experience.4 In
his chapter on “Solipsism” he claims that the life of the soul is constantly involved in “the
painful task of unifying (to a greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and passing,
when possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall somehow include
and transmute them” (362). Such an inclusion and transmutation of “discordant viewpoints” is an
act akin to what the “mind of the poet” should at all times be doing: “always forming new
wholes.” Both acts of unifying “jarring and incompatible” (KE) thoughts and of “amalgamating
disparate experiences” (Selected Prose, MP) resist isolating the internal faculties of the mind,
bridging potential for unifying a dissociated sensibility. The poet is, under these terms, both an
impersonal medium and, like Donne, bringing both his inner world and his outer world into
union.
Eliot’s attitude towards Donne, however, changed drastically over the course of his
career. In “The Metaphysical Poets” Donne was used as an emblem for how to order the
emotional life and the feeling life, but in his later Clark Lectures, Eliot identifies Donne as a
figure of, what he calls, “psychologism.” Eliot’s problem with the cultural turn to psychologism
is both in the way that it creates a prioritized order of internal operations, but also in the way the
psychological outlook finds its objects of desire. The revolution of the psychological was, for
Eliot, “immense”: “Instead of ideas as meanings, as references to an outside world, you have
suddenly a new world coming into existence, inside your own mind and therefore by the usual
implication inside your own head” (635). Eliot’s theory of the psychological is in some sense a
revision of the “dissociation of sensibility” and the “objective correlative.” The emotions, rather
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than finding objects in the “outside world,” became the very objects of contemplation. The
psychological imperative to turn inward buffered the inner world from the potential of the outer
world. The psychological approach is thus always looking for better expressions of itself, but
unable to find an object beyond itself, desire’s ability to grow outward is thwarted. The problem
of psychologism, for Eliot, crystallizes some of his concerns with the brokenness of the internal
life, as well as the excess of emotion in modern life; but further, he is beginning to articulate the
importance of contemplating the object of desire, rather than the feeling of desire. Though he
does not ascribe causality to the “dissociation of sensibility,” his later identification of what he
calls “psychologism” is a a main culprit in the brokenness of modern culture.
Eliot’s theory of the multiple dissociations and the “objective correlative” work through a
massive amount of desires. In having an ever-widening inventory of objects, the desires of
Eliot’s early career have a tendency to be spread thin. What does it mean for Eliot to be
constantly involved in the project of re-association, while the actual fulfillment of this project
may not be possible? His desire for unification, on the cultural and literary levels, are prosaically
dictated in “The Metaphysical Poets” and “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” yet they are not
expressed in their entirety. The poetic form allows Eliot to engage with the project of reassociation in an altogether different manner, while also entertaining some of the problems he
posed in his later Clark Lectures on psychologism. The poems offer glimpses into the emotional
lives of the subjects of “dissociation.”
The narrators of “Prufrock” and “Gerontion” are dramatized embodiments of particular
strains within the whole problem of “dissociation.” Eliot systematically inserts allusions of the
past into his early poems, most notably in “Prufrock” and “Gerontion,” but the fragmented
allusions juxtaposed against the modern landscape do not necessarily convene in a state of
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unification. While this is in some sense an admittance that the imperatives of “Tradition” have
not been rendered complete, Eliot exaggerates the distance between the past and the present, or
in other words, the distance between his own critical desire and its object. The allusions are
placed in direct proximity with the modern, yet in this effort to actualize the “pastness of the
past” and its “presence,” they create an exaggerated sense of disunion between the historical and
the modern. What does it mean for Eliot’s allusions to be placed into the space of the poem,
which hypothetically should fortify some of his claims on time in “Tradition,” but for them to
not necessarily become “associated”?
Beyond the poem’s allusive relationship to time, the voices in Eliot’s early work are
frequently over-burdened by either too much consciousness or too much feeling; they carry the
weight of the “dissociated” sensibility. Both “Prufrock” and “Gerontion” are figures subject to an
unsustainable amount of desires. Eliot poetically dramatizes the qualities he theoretically
criticizes. But if we are to consider the mass of objects desired after in the whole project of reassociation, perhaps Eliot is not altogether separate form his poetic subjects. In this next section I
will analyze “Prufrock” and “Gerontion” as case studies in Eliot’s own theory of the
“dissociation” and desire, but further, how they relate to Eliot’s own tendencies.

***
“The Love Song of Alfred J. Prufrock” is a poem profuse with literary allusions, which in
one sense calls attention to the continuity of the “pastness of the past” and of its “presence,”
(Selected Prose, “TIT” 38) while on the other dramatizes the frictions and disparities between
the ancient and the modern. Eliot begins the collection Prufrock and Other Observations with an
epigraph from Dante’s Inferno in the original Italian that translated, reads “If I believed that my
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answer were given to one who would return to the world, this flame would stand without
moving. But because no one ever returned alive from this depth, if I have heard the truth, I
answer you without fear of infamy.” This is from a moment in the 8th Circle of Inferno XXVII in
which Guido da Montefeltro indicates the fraudulence and corruption of Florence to the pilgrim
Dante. The intertextuality of the epigraph brings us into the text by obscuring the origin of
voices; Prufrock’s voice assumes Dante’s and vice versa, as well as obscuring the spatial bounds
of the poem. We are ushered forth to the edge of hell, and then drawn back into the world of the
“Love Song.” Eliot introduces Prufrock’s worldview by establishing its relation to a hell-like
landscape, parodying the grand stakes of Dante in its relation to a relatively normal, modern city.
The spatial and intertextual confusion suggest Prufrock is in a modern, secularized iteration of
Hell, but there is no indication of what the conditions and features of his damnation are; as far as
we are concerned, Prufrock has committed no moral transgression. The allusions in “Prufrock”
create a distinct temporal friction: In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” the past is purported
to create a symmetry and continuity between the ages, yet in the space of this poem, the radical
incongruity with Dante parodies Prufrock’s perspective.
Though we are not cued into the qualifications of Prufrock’s damnation, one gets the
sense that his cityscape with “streets that follow like a tedious argument” is not dissimilar from
the private hell of the aimless modern malaises. Even yet, the apex of Prufrock’s wrongdoing
resides in his anxiety over action: “Do I dare / Disturb the universe?” In his essay on
“Baudelaire,” Eliot praises the French symbolist for being concerned with “the real problem of
good and evil.” He claims that “in an age of progressive degradation, “ damnation itself “is an
immediate source of salvation - salvation from the ennui of modern life, because it at last give
some significance to living” (Selected Prose, 235). Prufrock is a figure condemned to the
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damnation of the “ennui of modern life,” striving towards a “significance to living” through
attempting to implicate narratives of the past into the modern, yet he is unable to transcend the
perimeters of the secularized iteration of hell he inhabits.
Similarly, Prufrock attempts to traverse the territory of ascetic practice and biblical
narrative, but the symbols of the past take on a relational meaning once mapped onto his own
existence. “Though I have wept and fasted, wept and prayed, / Though I have seen my head
(grown slightly bald) brought in upon a platter.” The idiom of having one’s head brought in upon
a platter recalls The Gospel of St. Mark, in which Herodias asks for John the Baptist’s head
brought in upon a platter during an extravagant banquet celebrating Herod’s birthday, and
prefiguring the death of Jesus, the demand is carried out. John the Baptist is elevated to
sainthood, but Prufrock is “no prophet - and there’s no great matter.” Unlike the dignity in the
beheading of St. John, Prufrock’s beheading is made slightly ludicrous: His decapitated head has
“grown slightly bald.” As a poem, “Prufrock” appeals to the “traditional sensibility” by mapping
scattered allusions onto Prufrock’s own existence, yet unlike Eliot’s statement in prose, the
incongruity between the pastness of the past and the presentness of the present is
insurmountable. The symbols of the past function as proxies for older, more culturally intact
forms for action to look to; but when Prufrock interacts with them, they are translated down and
subsequently made absurd. Eliot plays out the tensions in Prufrock’s inability to integrate older
narratives into the closed system of Prufrock’s modern dilemma; he attempts to open doors into
other narratives, but the inconsistencies thwart any possibility for eclipsing the damnation of
ennui. Despite his attraction to older paradigms, the invocation of allusions widens Prufrock’s
distance from them.
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While Eliot urges the poet to dwell in “not merely the present, but the present moment of
the past,” (Selected Prose, TIT 44) Prufrock’s consciousness demonstrates the occupational
hazards of integrating fragments of the past into the modern without a robust, integrative
framework. He is a figure attempting to embody Eliot’s “traditional sensibility,” but in the
immense, undisciplined order of his desires, he is unable to assent to their implementation. In
contrast, however, with Prufrock’s yearning to implicate symbols of the ancient into the modern
landscape, “Gerontion” is a poem that extends the Prufrockian perspective on historicity to its
furthest extent: What occurs when the “struggle toward unification” is utterly relinquished?
Of all Eliot’s works, “Gerontion” is the most strikingly similar poem to “Prufrock.” Both
are the first and most substantial pieces in their respective collections, and both hinge on figures
occupying a distilled, implacable malaises. There is a moment in the interior monologue of
“Gerontion” that dramatizes his thought process on existing in a world devoid of cultural
integration:
After such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think now
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions
Guides us by vanities. Think now
She gives when our attention is distracted
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions
That the giving famishes the craving. Gives too late
What’s not believed in, or if still believed,
In memory only, reconsidered passion.
The poem was first titled “Gerousia,” which broken down simply means old age and ousia - the
Greek word for being. Gerontion’s name is reflective of his state of being: “Here I am, an old
man in a dry month, / Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.” While Prufrock progressively
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grows older throughout the poem, Gerontion is old upon arrival. One gets the sense that the dry
landscape, the burden of history, and Gerontion himself are coextensive images - distinct, yet at
other moments interchangeable. The image of history as a house with “cunning passages” and
“contrived corridors” is a device for analyzing it as something that is both inhabited and other,
something that is fundamentally disorienting. The home, or the feminized “history” is given
autonomy over the communal “us”: Its passages are “cunning” and “contrived,” created
deliberately in deceit. The home is referred to as his own “decayed house” near the beginning of
the poem, but by the end, it is merely a “rented house.” The home Gerontion inhabits, or history
itself, actively work upon Gerontion as he is deprived of all semblances of autonomy amidst the
confusion of history’s passages.
Gerontion’s recurring plea to “think now,” whether directed toward himself or an
imagined audience, lends some sense of immediacy to the situation at hand. The poem, however,
begins parched with our “old man in a dry month / Being read to by a boy, Waiting for rain,” and
dismissively, ends parched: “Thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season.” While there seems to be
moments for potential transformation in “Prufrock,” the voice of “Gerontion” makes no attempts
to work outside of the poem’s own closed system. As opposed to the proliferation of allusions
that are interwoven into the poem’s modern landscape of “Prufrock,” Gerontion overtly recalls
allusions by stating them in the negative: “I was neither at the hot gates / Nor fought in the warm
rain / Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass.” He makes reference to heroism and
antiquity, yet as bygone symbols that have lost traction amidst the “contrived corridors” and
“cunning passages” of time. Though the older models created an effect of incongruity in
“Prufrock,” they were charged with a certain hope. In contrast, Gerontion announces his
allusions as ineffectual. The images themselves are recognizable, but their meaning has
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disintegrated. He possesses the memory of the past, the “historical sense” but is utterly estranged
from it, and is therefore without the “traditional sensibility” (Selected Prose, TIT 38). What is
still “believed” in only exists in “memory,” or lives as half-dead “reconsidered passion.”
Gerontion has an excess of the “historical sense,” but his body, his belief, and sense of vitality
ultimately atrophy in the absence of “tradition.” The dissociation of cultural symbols and feeling
in “Gerontion” is translated into the landscape he inhabits - existing on the threshold of
dehydration and death, yet somehow still existent.
As Eliot tasks the poet to give life to memory through literature’s “simultaneous
existence,” “Prufrock” and “Gerontion” are not expressions of Eliot’s own privately held truths,
but embodiments of some of the cultural absences expressed in the doctrine of “dissociation.”
Hugh Kenner identifies Prufrock as names with a voice: “He is the name of a possible zone of
consciousness where the materials with which he is credited with being aware can co-exist.” The
same can be said for Gerontion. The voices’ inundation in their respective “zones of
consciousness” represent a set of cultural concerns that are not explicitly Eliot’s, but resemble
many of his own concerns. Eliot writes that in order to refine a “consciousness of the past,”
which is ultimately an effort against the dissociation, the poet must refine their own impersonal
voice: “What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something
which is more valuable. What happens with an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual
extinction of personality” (Selected Prose, TIT 40). Eliot’s impersonal theory of poetry hinges
on this approach. The voices taken on in “Gerontion” and “Prufrock” do not literally cast Eliot’s
own internal life, or “personality” into verse, but they are symbolic; capturing and dramatizing a
mood that is at once occupied, and other. “Gerontion” may be an expression of Eliot’s most
nihilistic moods; yet at the same time, the theory of impersonality decenters the human subject as
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the ultimate source of meaning, allowing for the distilled poetic perspectives to become sources
from which the moral and spiritual problems of the modern can be extrapolated. Eliot’s tendency
to not attempt to make the very desires he posits actualized in his poetics further exaggerates the
sense that perhaps his theoretical objects of longing are precisely distant. Through the impersonal
order of poetry, Eliot is able to critically exaggerate the imbalance in excess of the dissociated
sensibility.
Eliot’s characterization of Hamlet as the embodiment of the “objective correlative” reads
as if he is framing him as a proto-modern - a case study in what occurs under the “dissociated
sensibility.” There is, however, a tangible identification between Hamlet as a figure of “intense
feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object” (Selected Prose, HHP 49)
and Prufrock. In the same manner that Hamlet’s emotions exceed its object, Prufrock is a figure
imprisoned in his consciousness with an excess of feeling that cannot be properly translated into
explicit word or action. The very object of emotion that spurs the inaction is unknown, but it is
both attended to and obscured through the profusion of excuses, questions, and prevarications:
Before dealing with the unstated “overwhelming question” posed in the first stanza, he
continually assures us there will be “time for a hundred indecisions, / And for a hundred visions
and revisions, / Before the taking of a toast and tea.” He incessantly reminds us that “there will
be time,” yet the object of action escapes each time he asserts it, and is again reinstated with
another undermined action. Though the title of the poem is “The Love Song of Alfred J.
Prufrock,” the question of who he is speaking to and what his object of “love” is remains elusive.
In the same manner that Eliot identifies Hamlet’s desires as not having a proper object with
which to correlate, Prufrock’s engagement with desire enacts and exacerbates the problems
stated in “Hamlet and His Problems.” The recurring phraseology of “Would it have been worth
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while” temporally disrupts the flow of the poem by positioning Prufrock’s perspective in the
future, looking back on the world depicted in the poem, while simultaneously asking us
questions on the value of the present. His temporal consciousness appears too big for him to
process and contain; his awareness of time’s scope seems to have no limits. Prufrock amasses
many objects of desire, yet in being manifold, none of them are attained.
Prufrock, unlike Gerontion, is a figure burdened by unbridled desires “without an object
or exceeding its object,” leading to a state of paralyzed inaction. Despite Hamlet being
something of a proto-modern model for the creation of the Prufrockian figure, Prufrock
professedly denounces his relation to Hamlet. He exclaims: “No! I am no Prince Hamlet, nor was
meant to be / Am an attendant lord, one that will do / To swell a progress, start a scene or two.”
Both Hamlet and Prufrock are doomed by too much consciousness and too many emotions, but
despite the “buffoonery” (Selected Prose, HHP 48) of Hamlet’s emotion, Prufrock is merely an
“attendant lord” and is unable to elevate his own malaise to the realm of Shakespearean tragedy.
There is no interplay of murder, jealousy, and revenge in his “Love Song.” Perhaps the most
tragic element of the poem is, despite his unwavering insistence on invoking allusions, the dearth
in meaning of the older models for action and his inability to locate any decipherable object to
desire. Durkheim’s study on Suicide illumes some of the strains in Prufrock’s desire: “Unlimited
desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity.
Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot
be quenched. Indistinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture” (247). Prufrock’s desires are
fatally unlimited. “After the novels, after the teacups, after the skirts that trail along the floor — /
And this, and so much more? —”. Though Prufrock does not possess the ability to recognize the
“morbidity” in his miserable predicament, that his desires are insatiable and his questions
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unanswerable, his “indistinguishable thirst,” like the “objective correlative,” is sustained by a
state of excess. As his desires “surpass the means at their command,” Prufrock does not possess
the moral or spiritual paradigms to answer, or even pose, the questions he seems to be concerned
with. The banality of the answers to said questions often involve unrelated objects like “tea and
toast,” depreciating the momentum of the questions at hand and deflating the possibility for there
to even be “so much more.”
Prufrock does not know which objects to desire, and therefore does not know what to act
for. Action is oriented toward purpose, but Prufrock is a figure with an excess of impetus
uprooted from any abiding purpose. Echoing Durkheim, Eugene Goodheart wrote that “It is
precisely the elevation of [...] desire as a supreme value, that entails as one of its consequences of
enervation. [...] Illimitable desire generates impossible and self-defeating expectations which
produce the experience of despair” (13). Perhaps Prufrock does not consciously imagine desire
as a “supreme value,” but it dictates the proceedings of his consciousness. In Prufrock’s inability
to extract himself from his own over-saturation of desire, he is unable to identify what its object
is; it is a self-begetting mechanism that “enervates” the potency of the feeling, while also
sustaining itself on the feeling of “despair” without an object-identification. If Prufrock is
unaware of the very objects he desires, how can his longings ever be made consummate? He asks
us “Then how should I begin? / To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways? / And how
should I presume?” By asking us how to “presume” while also asking how to “begin,” the very
grounds of his actions and presumptions seem to have not yet begun to take form. Despite the
poem being formulated as an extended question, he continually undermines his efforts to reach
toward the elusive object in claims such as “It is impossible to say just what I mean!” It is almost
as if his questions are a form of apophasis, yet he is not circumventing the object because it is
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inexpressible; he prevaricates because the object itself is not made clear even to him. The images
answering his questions either thwart the driving force of the query, or the questions themselves
exceed any sensible object that it could be attached to. Prufrock’s desire is objectless because of
the manifold objects he attaches it to. He is a figure channeling his energy into objectless
“illimitable desire,” inducing a form of “despair” and paralysis, or in Durkheim’s words,
“constantly renewed torture.”
While Prufrock’s desire for meaning is not extinguished until the moment of his
figurative death when “human voices wake us, and we drown,” Gerontion establishes that his
faculties of desire have already been extinguished long ago. He is a figure who has surpassed the
terms of the objective correlative and escaped the bounds of “illimitable desire”: He is both
alienated from history and his own senses, and therefore alienated from any impetus. There is no
need for him to comprehend and “objectify” the emotions because history and emotions have
withered along with the rest of the landscape into “reconsidered passion[s].” What history gives,
it “gives with such supple confusions / That the giving famishes the craving. Gives too late”. The
act of history “giving” is repeated five times in the stanza I previously quoted, yet what is given
is either “too late,” given “too soon,” or offered with “such supple confusions,” that it devours its
object by “famish[ing] the craving.” History is personified into a malevolent force working
against humanity, and though its course is dictated by a temporal schema, the misalignment
between it offering knowledge “too late” and “too soon” demonstrate how adrift Gerontion is
from the past being an operative element in the present. Given “too late,” knowledge of the past
desiccates the “craving,” or the potential for desire.
In contrast with Prufrock’s excessive questions concerning how to act, Gerontion is under
the impression that “neither fear nor courage saves us,” suggesting that perhaps nothing will. As
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mentioned prior, the dry landscape, the burden of history, and Gerontion himself are coextensive
images. He recalls the power in the sensuousness of his youth that has been lost in old age,
claiming “I have lost my passion: why should I need to keep it / Since what is kept must be
adulterated?” Within the mental and physical landscape he occupies, all “passion[s]” are
deadened and “adulterated” to the point of nonexistence. Gerontion has altogether lost his
passion, his capacity for deep, uncontrollable emotion. Following the loss of a Prufrockian
“passion,” Gerontion quickly pivots into the disintegration of the senses: “I have lost my sight,
smell, hearing, taste and touch: / How should I use them for your closer contact?” This is the first
moment in which Gerontion directly addresses a hypothetical reader, yet any attempt to forge a
connective network with the reader is immediately impeded. In the same manner that cultural
symbols which have been vacated of meaning haunt the poem, Gerontion’s sensual faculties are
still present on the body, but are no longer operative. Prufrock’s stiflement was in excess, but
Gerontion has lost both his “passion” and his sense, and thereby all methods for perceiving and
processing external stimuli. Unmoored from history and connectivity, he and all other “tenants of
the house” are merely “whirled [...] fractured atoms” - aimless, isolated units. Though there is a
certain despair at the end of “Prufrock” when Prufrock “grow[s] old” and claims he does “not
think [the mermaids] will sing to [him],” the despair of “Gerontion” is much deeper. Rather than
the affliction being involved in a cycle of “illimitable desire,” Gerontion has resigned to a state
of utter hopelessness.
Juxtaposed against the profusion of questions in “Prufrock,” Gerontion claims there is no
“beauty in terror, terror in inquisition.” Unlike the aesthetic pleasure in the subdued horrors of
Prufrock’s bourgois drawing rooms scenes, the driving force of query has lost all substantial
meaning in “Gerontion.” His language of “beauty” and “terror” is reminiscent of the grandeur in

32
the romantic sublime, but in contrast, the force behind grasping at “the burden of the mystery /
[...] / Of all this unintelligible world,” (“Tintern Alley,” Wordsworth) is in itself an unintelligible
pursuit for Gerontion. There is no purpose in the act of inquiry, no semblance of “beauty” or
“horror,” and perhaps, in Wordsworth’s words, no necessary “burden of the mystery” at all.
Perhaps “Prufrock” more closely resembles the desire of Wordsworth, but rather than it being a
source of great pleasure, it eventually becomes an abstract energy with objects that fail to satisfy
it. Gerontion is a profoundly unromantic figure, burdened by his thoughts of resignation without
the capacity for contemplative emotion or desire. While Prufrock struggles against his state of
paralysis, Gerontion sinks into his role as an “old man in a draughty house.”
In his essay on “Baudelaire,” Eliot wrote that the underlying sadness in romantic poetry
is “due to the exploitation of the fact that no human relations are adequate to human desires, but
also to the disbelief in any further object for human desires than that which, being human, fails to
satisfy them” (Selected Prose, 235). The “sadness” of romantic poetry is similar to the “despair”
of illimitable desire: Both are contingent upon the continuous act of desire that, without a
correlating object, is not able to be attained and “satisfied.” Eliot picks up on the romantic strain
of sublimity in “Prufrock,” parodying it through the mass of obtuse questions that grasp at
something larger, but in their objectlessness, are fleeting. Eliot disparages the romantic “disbelief
in any further object for human desires,” suggesting that they fail to satisfy because they are not
properly ordered and directed, but he is also suggesting that, without articulating what they are,
there may be objects of longing beyond the immanent frame. The charge of desire is here thus
not relegated to the project of re-association. Prufrock probes an external mystery, but his
consciousness is foundationally rooted in desires relegated to “being human,” barring him from a
fulfilling satiation and inducing a state of despair. Desire is something of a spiritual disease for
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both “Prufrock” and “Gerontion,” yet in deeply different ways: Prufrock is debilitated, yet
sustained by the failure of his desires, while Gerontion is sustained in his acquiescence to
desire’s futility. His desires do not strain toward any object at all, whether human, existential, or
spiritual, but they are simply muted and impeded by his despondence.
“Prufrock” and “Gerontion” occupy discrete “zone[s] of consciousness,” (Kenner) but the
the poems are not only conversant in a similar dialogue; they are self-reflexively conversant with
each other. “Gerontion,” a poem written five years after “Prufrock,” recalls the same set of
problems—the dissociated sensibility and the dissociated cultural landscape—but their
perspectives embody different moments in the larger spectrum of Eliotic moods. Prufrock claims
that there will be time “yet for a hundred indecisions, / And for a hundred revisions,” which is
echoed by Gerontion’s statement that “a thousand small deliberations / Protract the profit of their
chilled delirium, / Excite the membrane, when the sense has cooled.” These are tonally very
different sentiments, yet the same language of indeterminate prevarications creates a distinct
lineage between the two poems. The monorhyme in Prufrock’s “decisions” and “revisions”
communicates a redundancy that is repeated again in the next stanza, yet it is stated with playful
irony. Unlike “Prufrock,” Gerontion’s “small deliberations” do not formally constitute the
structure of the poem itself. Prufrock is too embroiled in his “indecisions” and “revisions” to
himself perform the role of the cultural diagnostician, but Eliot endows Gerontion with a selfawareness that allows him to recall and have “such knowledge” of the Prufrockian malaises. The
“small deliberations” that Gerontion refers to is a nod to the Prufrockian sensibility, but, as he
claims, it “protracts the chilled delirium.” Gerontion possesses the capacity to recognize
Prufrock’s stasis, but rather than succumbing to the allure of entertaining “a thousand small
deliberations,” he actively sinks himself into a delirium of despair. The neutral scientific

34
language of a “membrane” being “excite[d]” evacuates all sensuousness and emotion that could
potentially be derived from the “small deliberations,” and feeling is denigrated to the language of
scientific analysis since he has “lost [his] passion” and his “sight, smell, hearing, taste and
touch.” The moods of “Prufrock” are thus dramatized in “Gerontion,” but pushed into the realm
of a terminal despondency that is made manifest in the landscape, the body, and history itself.
Ultimately, the desire of “Prufrock” and “Gerontion” are drawn from the same Eliotic
concerns established in the “dissociation of sensibility.” By casting the same perspectives he
makes an effort against in his prose into poetic form, the voices are made studies in different
cultural pathologies at different stages of the “dissociation”: “Prufrock” resembles the romantic
inclination toward an excess in internality, while “Gerontion” resembles something far more
ominous - a total detachment from any desire for re-association. The voices of “Prufrock” and
“Gerontion” are not explicitly Eliot’s, but they are Eliotic. While these voices are symbolic
distillations of particular cultural threads, Eliot is himself not excluded from the culture he makes
his object of study. “Gerontion” is something of an expression of Eliot’s most nihilistic mood,
but Prufrock’s relationship to desire is not terribly dissimilar from the way Eliot’s moral,
cultural, and literary desires are articulated in the whole project of re-association.
The pursuit of re-association contains a multitude of objects and sub-desires. It concerns
the composition of the internal life and the cultural landscape, and all of the sinews in between
that have been broken by the moment of rupture - the dissociation. Prufrock is a figure
representative of the problem of the “objective correlative,” burdened by an excess of emotions
and desires that do not necessarily correlate to a decipherable object or action in the world. This
problem, however, is perhaps the same methodological problem with the pursuit of reassociation. Eliot is certainly not a representative of the “objective correlative,” but in the same
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way Prufrock does not find any correlating objects to his vertigo of desires, perhaps Eliot does
not either. He establishes what the objects of desire are, but they are only partially resolved in
“the painful task of unifying (to a greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and
passing, when possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall
somehow include and transmute them” (KE). What, however, occurs if there are too many
objects for “the painful task of unifying” to process? Considering the immensity of demands for
re-association, perhaps Eliot is, like Prufrock, burdened by an excess of his own desires.
Beyond the host of these desires being too vast, they are also limited. The secular desire
Goodheart illustrates is “illimitable” because the objects of desire it orients itself towards are
limited to the material world. Perhaps the amount of desires Eliot projects onto the cultural
landscape is too vast, too expansive to ever be made complete. Harkening back to Eugene
Goodheart’s distinction between desire within the religious imagination and desire within the
secular imagination, Eliot’s earliest articulations of desire were restricted to the this-worldly
objects. Without one ultimate object to identify with, Eliot’s desire for unification proliferates.
Eliot critiqued “psychologism” for relegating desire to the internal sphere, but his early
relationship to desire was also relegated to a particular scope. The aperture was certainly more
extensive than a mere focus on the internal life, but compared to Eliot’s later ascetic professions
of the role of desire, the possibility for it under the terms of “dissociation” is meager. Though
Kermode’s analogy of the “dissociation” as the Fall is suggestive of salvation, Eliot’s project of
re-association does not exactly possess the promise of redemption. The closest semblance of
salvation resides in Eliot’s desires for re-integration, but the project of re-association is
insurmountable, and as I have established, these desires are “insatiable.”

36
Eliot’s early criticism exists in a miserable paradox because, though it strives towards
unification, the fulfillment of its own efforts is necessarily impossible. Eliot had not yet
articulated his Christian sensibilities in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and “The
Metaphysical Poets,” but his continual insistence on unification, though written under thoroughly
secular terms, has resonances with the Christian promise of unification with God. The objects of
desire in his critical prose are relegated to the material world and the cultural landscape, and thus
are barred from any purpose beyond the physical world. The impossibility of their fulfillment
begets an extended disappointment in the present, but in The Waste Land, Eliot begins to widen
his temporal scope. Desire, rather than being localized in the material world, is allowed to take
other forms. The longing for tangible objects, the massive re-association, causes a type of
suffering, but even so, the suffering is not necessarily rendered meaningful as it is not being
oriented towards a higher purpose. What would it look like for the suffering desire causes to be
comprehended? Eliot embarked on an almost impossible project in the effort of re-association,
but in The Waste Land, Eliot begins to work through a radical reorientation of desire beyond the
immanent frame.
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Chapter Two
––––––––––––––––––

Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly: The Reorientation of Desire in The Waste Land

In a letter written to Otto Heller in 1923, Eliot commented on the perceived difficulties of
The Waste Land: “The poem is neither a success nor a failure—simply a struggle.” (Letters,
574). Perhaps all of Eliot’s thought up to this point can be understood in terms of a “struggle,”
but what does it mean for the poem itself to be a struggle? As I argued in the last chapter, Eliot
extends the internal “struggle toward unification” (Selected Prose, “MP” 65) onto the literary,
the cultural, and the historical, but what is The Waste Land struggling towards, or alternatively,
against? The critical constructs surrounding The Waste Land typically go as follows: It is a poem
saturated by the dryness of disbelief in the post-World War I era, but the showers in “What the
Thunder Said” wash away all previous despair with the final lines of the poem, “Shantih shantih
shantih.” While this is an attractive interpretive lens, it does not necessarily lend itself to
imagining the poem outside the realm of the material world. Further, it does not deal with the
multiple iterations of desire in the first four sections and the possibility that they are grasping
towards something beyond their own representation. One of the primary problems with Eliot’s
project for re-association was that its temporal scope was too narrow for the mass of desires that
were projected into it. The Waste Land, however, contends with the the problem of desire
through attempting a massive reorientation of what its objects are. In this chapter I will argue
that, though The Waste Land was written five years before Eliot’s conversion to AngloCatholicism in 1927, the “struggle” of the poem is not limited to this-worldly desires, but rather
that it creates an opening for desire to become attached to objects that are not restricted to the
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material world. Eliot’s secular language of the desire for re-integration, not finding a proper
object in the physical world, is thus extended and re-directed into a religious discourse in the
poetics of The Waste Land.
The Waste Land is marked by its fragmentation and multi-vocalism. The emergence of
disparate voices express disparate desires, and they are continually obstructed and re-ordered by
the emergence of another voice. The poem’s multi-vocality creates an overarching structure,
informing the contours of language and form, while also giving voice to an array of diverse
desires. In the second section, “ A Game of Chess,” a bourgeois woman struggles for
communication with her partner, asking him “Are you alive, or not? Is there nothing in your
head?” which is abruptly squandered with the emergence of another voice who urges a figure
named Lil to sleep with her husband who “wants a good time” after he has been away at war and
she has gotten a series of abortions. The poem’s multi-vocality radically juxtaposes two very
different forms of intimacy against each other, yet both are rendered hollow. The structure
provides order to the disorder of desires, structuring the plethora of voices; but in doing so, the
desires are continuously negated for another to emerge.
The poetic device of multi-vocality parallels Eliot’s critical insistence on the “struggle
toward unification,” (Selected Prose, MP 65) but in the amalgamation of distant voices in The
Waste Land, Eliot is doing something considerably different. The insistence on aggregating and
then negating bears resemblance to apophatic theology, the practice of approaching the divine
through that which cannot be stated. While Eliot discursively states his objects of desire in the
project of “re-association,” The Waste Land begins to approach a vision of desire that considers
its object fundamentally impenetrable. Fleeting representations of desire prod at an ultimate
object that holds them all in tandem, but there is a sense that the greater object itself is
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unknowable. The very faculty of desire, thus, becomes an object of study, calling into question
how we do or do not desire, as well as the veracity of what our objects of desire are at all.
Through its multi-vocalism, The Waste Land is working toward an ascetic disciplining of the
faculty of desire; at moments apophatically offering visions of debased desires, while at other
moments offering glimpses into what a redirection of these desires could look like. As I stated in
the previous chapter, the proliferation of Prufrock’s questions may appear apophatic, but the
resemblance is made ridiculous in the absence of any decipherable object. The Waste Land’s
object of contemplation is not necessarily the cultural landscape or the organization of the
internal life, but how to direct desire at all.
Eliot marks both his literary criticism and his poetics by the language of “struggle.”
What, then, are its continual efforts against and what are its constraints? While the struggle in his
criticism and the struggle of The Waste Land are related, they are not exactly the same. The
whole project of cultural re-association is limited to the cultural, but the claim of The Waste
Land’s “struggle” is multi-valenced, opening the possibility for the struggle in desire to be
considered under terms that are not restricted to the tangible. The Waste Land was, however,
written two decades prior and is an exploration of desire that is not materialist, but does not
explicitly avow an organized religious thought, either. There is not exactly a clean distinction
between Eliot’s concerns with culture and his concerns with the spiritual state of man. Eliot was
of course writing on the state of culture while he was writing The Waste Land—“The
Metaphysical Poets” was published just a year before The Waste Land—but I would like to make
the distinction between these two distinct, yet mutually informative, modes of thought, while
primarily focusing on the spiritual implications. As poetry allows Eliot to make statements that
are not explicitly entertained in his prose, the capaciousness of poetic language opens up a
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clearing for what the desires are that fuel its “struggle.” The cultural concerns of Eliot’s early
career become assimilated into a more comprehensive vision of desire with a wider temporal
scope. While the cultural concerns Eliot expresses in his early work are maintained and
expanded upon in The Waste Land, the “struggle” becomes imbued as spiritual, beyond the
material world.
As Eliot grew to think of desire as a metaphysical inevitability, something that can be at
once unbound and satiable in its distance, he made his own distinction between material desire
and spiritual desire. Concerning what occurs after sexual longing has been made consummate,
Eliot wrote that “The union in ecstasy is complete, is final; and two human beings, needing
nothing beyond each other, rest on their emotions of enjoyment. But emotions cannot rest; desire
must expand, or will shrink” (CL, 660). If the perimeters of desire are restricted to sexual
satisfaction, desire has an attainable telos, and that once being attained, the whole of “desire,” in
all its possibilities, contracts. The imperative for desire to “expand” is evocative of the unbound
religious desire referenced in Goodheart, but without the explicit usage of religious terms. 5 Eliot
is suggesting that, rather than desire exist in a closed narrative of personal longing and
fulfillment, it can be enlarged to something greater than the self. He is calling for a reckoning
with desire that is both beyond materiality, beyond human relations, and beyond an orientation
towards an attainable end.
In contrast with Eliot’s attempts to detach desire from its colloquial connotation with lust,
Freud is the paradigmatic model of secular desire that Eliot is working against. Freud posits
sexual energy as the driving force behind all actions and longing in Civilization and Its
Discontents, suggesting that they are all, what he calls,“displacements” of libido:

5

When I use the language of “religious desire” in this chapter I am not explicitly referring to religion as an
institutional system of worship, but as attempts toward a transcendent, spiritual domain.
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In this, sublimation of the instincts lends its assistance. One gains the most if one one can
sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure from the sources of physical and intellectual
work. [...] A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist’s joy in creating, in giving his
phantasies body, or a scientist’s in solving problems or discovering truths, has a special
quality which we shall certainly one day be able to characterize in metapsychological
terms. At present we can only say figuratively that such satisfactions seem ‘finer and
higher’. But their intensity is mild as compared with that derived from the sating of crude
and primary instinctual impulses; it does not convulse our being. (26-27)
Freud’s reductionist understanding of desire suggests that all loves—love for a friend, for an
activity, for a partner—are mere modulations of basic sexual energy. The libido is sublimated
into other, more socially acceptable outlets; but for Freud, sublimated objects are substitutional.
They do not, like the “primary instinctual impulses” of the libido, “convulse our being.” His
claims that all sublimated desires, the “artist’s joy in creating” and the scientist’s joy “in
discovering truths,” are outgrowths of a more fundamental, primitive sexual energy. Freud’s
theory is near opposite to Eliot’s: For Eliot, the “shrinking” of desire, the satisfaction of carnal
love, is a manifestation of misdirected desires. Rather than imagining human activity as a
misdirection of the libido, Eliot imagines the libido as a misdirection of a higher form of desire,
something that, in his words, must “expand.”
The multi-vocality of The Waste Land is the primary poetic method that allows for the
expansion of desire. The first manuscript of The Waste Land, before Ezra Pound severely edited
it, was entitled “He Do the Police in Different Voices,” and in some respects, this may have been
a more fitting title. The many voices of the poem, spanning massive amounts of time and space,
find comfort in numbers, mutually obstructing and modifying each other in a continual process
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of momentary edification that is quickly obstructed. Symbols and allusions resurface throughout,
creating multiple layers of desire that interact through mutual interpretations and reinterpretations in the formation of an apophatic discourse. The etymology of “apophasis” means
to speak “away from.” By speaking “away from” the ultimate object of desire that the poem is
circumventing, The Waste Land gives voice to a multitude of desires that, through the negative,
illuminate what is unable to be spoken of positively. There is a resonance between what Eliot is
doing in The Waste Land and the negative theologies of the early church fathers. Cyril of
Jerusalem, a theologian of the early church, wrote in his Catechetical Homilies that, “For we
explain not what God is but candidly confess that we have not exact knowledge concerning Him.
For in what concerns God to confess our ignorance is the best knowledge.” Eliot is doing
something similar in The Waste Land: he does not “explain” what the object is that he is writing
around, but in creating an inventory of what it is not, he comes closer to what it is. The onslaught
of images of fertility, sexuality, and strained human relations, though they are debased, function
as contemplative objects in a grander scheme.
Desires in The Waste Land are never explicitly named, and there is not one continuous
recognizable desire in the poem’s set of symbolic associations, but the structure of the desires
gesture toward their disciplining. Eliot creates an inventory of multiple forms of desire in order
to purge them of their attachments. The objects of secular desire in The Waste Land, which I will
analyze in the next section of this chapter, function as negations, reaching towards what is in, or
beyond, The Waste Land.
***
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The first stanza in “The Burial of the Dead” performs an abrupt shift in vocality,
demonstrating the pace with which desires emerge and retreat. Eliot immediately introduces the
metaphorically fraught terms of fecundity and dryness:
April is the cruelest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.
Winter kept us warm, covering
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding
A little life with dried tubers.
Summer surprised us, coming over the Starnbergersee
With a shower of rain; we stopped in the colonnade,
And went on in sunlight, into the Hofgarten,
And drank coffee, and talked for an hour
Bin gar keine Russin, stamm’ aus Litauen, echt deutsch.
And when we were children, staying at the archduke’s,
My cousin’s, he took me on a sled,
And I was frightened. And down we went.
In the mountains, there you feel free.
I read, much of the night, and go south in the winter.
“Memory” is necessarily concerned with the past, while “desire,” if material, is necessarily
concerned with the future. “Memory” is restricted to what is available by thought and
documentation; it is a modulation of experience. But “desire,” depending upon its object, has an
entirely separate set of rules. Desire can be either fixed on the temporal or utterly removed from
it. To recall Goodheart’s dichotomy, desire within the religious imagination and desire within the
secular imagination operate under entirely different terms, and are even almost separate faculties.
Where, then, does this coalescence of memory and desire position the present? The past of
“memory” and the future of temporal “desire” displace the present moment, creating a
relationship to immediacy that is not necessarily concerned with the tangible. Eliot establishes
the poem as being fundamentally concerned with the exchange between memory and desire,
what occurs between them, and what their objects are. As established in the previous chapter, a
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“mixing” of the historical sense and the desire for re-association is the force behind much of
Eliot’s cultural criticism, but of course, “memory” and “desire” do not denote static referents,
and the poetic method, while concerned with much of the same problems present in the criticism,
allows for the capaciousness of language to expand. “Memory” and “desire” are then given the
space to suggest a slew of different meanings and objects, and further, be attached to a slew of
different voices. The exchange between historical memory and the desire for “association” and
re-integration are given the space to signify other memories, other desires, and the temporal
chasm between the two.
“Memory” and “desire” are, however, spurred by the latent symbolism in the coming of
spring. April, being the “cruelest month,” directly addresses time’s annual inevitability, while
also making reference to Easter’s place in the liturgical calendar. The festival celebrating God’s
redemptive acts and Christ’s resurrection inform April’s deep-seated symbolic relationship with
the sacrality of spring and the renewal of life. The etymological roots of “April” are uncertain,
but some theories posit it to be derived from the Latin “Aphrilis,” which translated means “to
open,” evoking the bloom of spring. The language of the rain and the land “breeding,” however,
imbues fertility with a sense of grotesque proliferation. Others have theories that since “Aphrilis”
is derived from the Greek “Aphrodite,” the goddess of love, pleasure, passion, and procreation,
more explicit references to human sexuality and rebirth are veiled in the very linguistic structure
of “April.” The symbolism of renewal in the Christian and the pagan is blended, establishing a
framework for the poem’s symbolic perimeters. The vastness of what “memory” and “desire”
can connote is relegated to the symbolic paradigm of “April,” but in the act of establishing its
myriad of associations, Eliot simultaneously violates the rules of their symbolic order: April is
“cruel.”
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The multi-vocalism of The Waste Land enacts Eliot’s theory of “tradition” as a method
for animating the past’s memory to the utmost extreme, placing voices of the past in direct
proximity with the present. The first voice of the first stanza in “Burial of the Dead,” performs a
strange ventriloquism with the opening lines of “The General Prologue” in The Canterbury
Tales, which reads:
When that April with his showers soote
The drought of March hath piercéd to the roote
And bathéd every vein in such liquor.
[...]
(So pricketh them Nature in their courages),
Then longen folk to on go pilgrimages.
The eroticism in the imagery of “showers” “pierc[ing] to the root” begets a renewal of life in the
general landscape, which then inspires “longen folk to go on pilgrimages.” The action of
“piérced” prefaces “pricketh,” which is a word that, over the course of the entirety of The Tales,
is attached to situations of conquest, affection, and sexual intimacy. The landscape’s fecundity is
translated into the disposition and behavior of its inhabitants: “So pricketh them Nature in their
courages.” Unlike the speaker in the first part of the stanza in “Burial of the Dead,” there is no
discontinuity between the mood of April and the “longen folk.” Eliot forges a direct
identification between the opening of The Canterbury Tales and The Waste Land, but the voice
in “Burial of the Dead” decidedly distances them. He revises the first few lines of the “General
Prologue” in order to demonstrate the speaker’s isolation from the natural world’s usual
symbolism, establishing the fraught baggage of April while lamenting the coming of spring. The
voice of the first stanza is not necessarily isolated from the seasonal cycle—he is in fact deeply
affected by it—but he re-orders the import of its symbols. As “memory” and “desire” were
concealed by “forgetful snow,” they were present, but just buried. In establishing The Waste
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Land as a poem concerned with “memory” and “desire,” Eliot simultaneously establishes their
burden.
While the first voice of the stanza establishes the suffering in the awakening of
“memory” and “desire,” a second voice, without any formal signification, is starkly juxtaposed
against the prior. The voice who tells us “In the mountains, there you feel free” is certainly not
the same that claims “April is the cruelest month.” Marie, a sentimental figure of royalty reflects
on her idyllic childhood and adulthood that is, unlike the first voice, dictated by popular
symbolic paradigms of the seasons. For Marie, there is little value placed on the seasons; she just
“goes south in the winter” to presumably escape the cold weather, and what the first voice
positively values as the “dead land.” The many voices of The Waste Land take on meaning in
their relationality. Marie modifies the previous statement, functioning as a counter to the
suffering in the awakening of “memory” and “desire.” In contrast, for Marie, the coming of
spring elicits the very pleasure that the first voice dreads. The pairing of the Eliotic and the voice
of Marie is a distilled account of the poem’s wider discourse, maximizing over-consciousness in
order to stage disparate perspectives. The interaction between these two voices, and this holds
true for the rest of the poem, is an act of placing “jarring” and “incompatible” perspectives in
direct conversation in the act of their transmutation (KE). Eliot stakes a claim on the
encumberment of spring as a bulwark against the re-imagining of desire, positing the possibility
for the dryness of the “dead land” to, unlike the world of “Gerontion,” take on a positive
meaning. The strangeness of the Eliotic claim that “April is the cruelest month” resounds
throughout the rest of the poem. At once drowned out and amplified by their juxtaposition, the
cruelty of fertility is exacerbated by the carelessness of Marie’s voice.
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As Eliot opens up the possibility for fecundity to be “cruel,” there are little to no visions
of a positive representation of sexual desire within the space of the poem. A painting of the rape
of Philomela by the “barbarous king” Tereus hangs on a mantelpiece in a sterile drawing room
and, despite the myth’s violence, it is described as yet another “withered stump of time.” The
temporal distance between “memory” and “desire” is conjured in by the presence of Philomela.
The myth itself is recounted as a memory, or a “stump of time” by virtue of its surroundings and
form, yet the story is a composite of violent, thrashing desires; those of lust, revenge, and
impaired communication:
Above the antique mantel was displayed
As though a window gave upon the sylvan scene
The change of Philomel, by the barbarous king
So rudely forced; yet there the nightingale
Filled all the desert with inviolable voice
And still she cried, and still the world pursues,
‘Jug jug’ to dirty ears.
The temporal distance between the past-tense of “cried” and the present tense of “pursues” is
indicative of a struggle: “the world” has attempted to comprehend what Philomela tries to
communicate, but the world is still in continuous pursuit. The object that “the world pursues,” or
what her “inviolable voice” struggles to communicate becomes incoherent when it falls upon
humanity’s “dirty ears.” The scene is placed in a space of over-sensuality: “Unstoppered, lurked
her strange synthetic perfumes, / Unguent, powdered, or liquid — troubled, confused / And
drowned the sense in odours; stirring by the air.” Both the myth of Philomela and the
environment it is placed in provide a glimpse into two exemplaries of desire that mutually inform
each other, but through the structure of the poem, are rejected. The aimless and “confused” oversensuality that “drowns” the senses is a materialization of the “excess” in emotion of romantic
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poetry that elicits a sense of despair in not having an object to attach itself to, leading to a
stunting of the senses.
The excess of the sensuousness in environment and the excess of violence in the myth
both lead to a state of speechlessness that is radically distinct from the moment with the hyacinth
girl in “Burial of the Dead” in which a voice recounts: “I could not / Speak, and my eyes failed, I
was neither / Living nor dead, and I knew nothing.” The speaker, recalling memories of the
“hyacinth girl” is subject to total perceptional collapse. Wading in what he calls “the heart of
light, the silence,” the voice becomes utterly suspended from both life and death, and all previous
thoughts are done away with: “I knew nothing.” The sensual and linguistic apparatuses
disintegrate when confronted by what is beyond the phenomenal, but Philomela is deprived of
language because of the despotic desires and violence acted upon her. Rather than peering “into
the heart of light, the silence,” or being inundated into sensual collapse by the presence of
something greater, she is unwillfully stripped of her humanity.
Despite this, she still “filled all the desert with inviolable voice.” The arid open vistas of
the desert are unable to host and sustain life, but the location amasses associative meaning
throughout Eliot’s own work and the whole of the devotional tradition he inserts himself into.
The barrenness of the “cactus land” in Hollow Men is representative of the modern’s incapacity
for belief, but the desert is here doing something entirely different. The imagery of Philomela’s
desert is reminiscent of the biblical association with ascetic struggle. The desert is the site of
Christian purification and surrender. Its inhospitality strips life of all pleasure and excess.
Philomela’s song that falls upon “dirty ears” fills the desert, the localized center for ascetic
tradition, but the question of whether or not she is heard reverberates throughout the poem.
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In the following section of the poem entitled “The Fire Sermon” her cries preface a
sexual encounter between a young woman “typist” and a “young man carbuncular”: “Jug jug jug
jug jug jug / So rudely forc’d / Tereu.” Her voice “filled all the desert,” but her calls are
ultimately rendered indecipherable. The “memory” of myth bears a tangible relation to the preset
and functions as an omen to the ensuing event. As Philomela remains in the form of a
nightingale, her medium of communication requires Tiresias’s augury; however, if her song is an
auspice, it falls upon “dirty ears.” This scene of modern erotic desire is recounted:
The time is now propitious, as he guesses,
The meal is ended, she is bored and tired,
Endeavors to engage herin caresses
Which still unreproved, if undesired.
Flushed and decided, he assaults at once;
Exploring hands encounter no defence;
His vanity requires no response,
And makes a welcome of indifference.
By transposing the tragedy of Philomela onto a somewhat disturbing scene of modern sexuality,
Eliot draws a direct lineage between the two narratives, but the conditions of their worlds alter
the emotional and moral stakes implicit in the stories. While the myth of Philomela belongs to
the enchanted order, the story of the young man carbuncular and the typist belongs to the
disenchanted order; or in other words, the causal relationships in the latter are not charged with a
cosmology.6 As opposed to the myth, the exchange between the young man carbuncular and the
typist is devoid of the supernatural, but further devoid of any substantial meaning or moral
framework. It is described in terms of militaristic language: he “assaults” and she puts up no
“defence.” Though the scene provokes the boundaries of consensuality, its tone is mute; Tiresias

6

Charles Taylor defines the difference between the “enchanted order” and the “disenchanted order”: “I am invoking
here [enchantment’s] negation, Weber’s expression “disenchantment” as a description of our modern civilization…
I’m going to use its antonym to describe a crucial feature of the pre-modern condition. The enchanted world in this
sense is the world of spirits, demons, and moral forces which our ancestors lived in.” (A Secular Age, 26)
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sequentially recounts actions in a matter-of-fact voice. The woman is made utterly passive to the
man’s advances, and though they are “undesired,” his “endeavors to engage her in caresses” are
“unreproved.” Though the young man was “flushed” and solitarily “decided” to “assault at
once,” not dissimilar from how Tereus “so rudely forc’d, there is no need for the carbuncular to
use force because he “makes welcome of [her] indifference.” There is a sense in which the
sexual act is utterly neutralized in this scene and made inconsequential to the point in which it
resembles rape, but is unable to access a moral framework that would recognize it as such.
After the man leaves, Tiresias says she “paces about her room again, alone / She smooths
her hair with automatic hand, / And puts on the gramophone.” The overpowering forces of desire
that occur in the myth of Philomela are muted, sublimated into a neutral form of sexuality that is
not subject to an overarching moral code. Eliot wrote in his essay on “Baudelaire” that “the
sexual act as evil is more dignified, less boring, than the natural, “life-giving,” cheery
automatism of the modern world” (Selected Prose, 236). The “automatism of the modern world”
is magnified in the woman’s body, describing her “automatic hand” in terms of machine. The
man and woman are further alienated from the sexual act through being identified by their
occupation; their identities are contingent upon their labor. While Eliot writes that “damnation is
an immediate source of salvation - salvation from the ennui of modern life, because it at last
gives some significance to living” (236), the young man carbuncular and the typist represent an
exchange in which carnality is entirely buffered from any robust moral framework, and is not
terribly different from what, in Eliot’s words in “Second Thoughts about Humanism,” the
“extremely clever, adaptable, and mischievous little animal does.”7 This mode of sexual conduct
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Eliot is here critiquing the humanist for borrowing certain aspects of religious morality without recognizing the
importance of a robust moral foundation: “I cannot understand a system of morals which seems to be founded on
nothing but itself—which exists, I suspect, only by illicit relations with either psychology or religion or both,
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is simultaneously rendered mechanized and animalistic, utterly deracinated from a coherent
value system. The sexual act is not able to be considered in terms of a “salvation” from the
monotonousness of the modern because the act itself has been utterly demoralized; it is
implicated in the very fabric of the “ennui of modern life.”
The exchange between the “young man carbuncular” and the “typist,” however, while it
seems to be utterly amoral, is functioning under moral pretenses. This scene, dictated by Tiresias,
is deployed as a voice within the apophatic discourse: It is established, but negated and
enveloped into the wider structure of negation. Harkening back to Eliot’s claim in his Clark
Lectures that “desire must expand, or will shrink,” the exchange between the young man
carbuncular and the typist is representative of desire’s contraction. In Eliot’s “Second Thoughts
on Humanism,” which I briefly quoted above, he wrote:
Man is man because he can recognize supernatural realities, not because he can invent
them. Either everything in man can be traced as a development from below, or something
must come from above. There is no avoiding that dilemma: you must either be a
materialist or a supernaturalist. If you remove from the word ‘human’ all that the belief in
the supernatural has given to man, you can view him finally as no more than an
extremely clever, adaptable, and mischievous little animal. (Selected Essays, 433)
The “materialist” point of view and the “supernaturalist” point of view contribute to the
interpretive lens through which the individual understands his humanity, but their differences are
insurmountable, and thereby fundamentally incompatible. Eliot states that if the human is,
however, deprived of a supernatural framework, he becomes reduced to the behavior of the “little

according to the bias of mind of the individual humanist.” Eliot’s meaning is here slightly different from my own,
but the importance of a comprehensive moral system is deeply informative to his thought across the board.
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animal.” Eliot’s retort that the foundation of what constitutes the human is his ability to
“recognize supernatural realities, not [...] invent them” is demonstrative of his later approach to
the “supernatural” as a metaphysical inevitability: it exists external to the ongoings of man. The
most important substance of the “human” is, then, contingent upon belief in the “supernatural”; if
“all that the belief in the supernatural has given to man” is eliminated, man is reduced to a
brutally physical, materialist reality deflated of meaning. The young man carbuncular and the
typist do not recognize “supernatural realities,” nor do they attempt to “invent them,” but the
desire present in their exchange is representative of brute materialism and demoralization.
Following the materially driven desires of the young man carbuncular and the typist,
Tiresias’s voice begins to vacillate between Augustine and the Buddha. The Augustinian allusion
is drawn from a moment in Confessions in which he confesses his “unholy loves” in order to
describe the process of the “ascent,” or the redirection of desire. In juxtaposition, the allusion to
the Pali “Fire Sermon” is drawn from a sermon in which the Buddha preaches on the liberation
of the senses through the cleansing force of fire. The collocation of these allusions provides a
cross-cultural example of what desire can look like under the terms of a “supernatural reality.”
The two texts are emblems of disciplined desire. The program of detachment in Buddhism
involves an extinguishing of desire, while Christian desire, as demonstrated in Eliot’s Clark
Lectures, necessarily involves an expansion. A monostich reading “To Carthage then I came” is
situated on its own line near the end of “The Fire Sermon.” This moment is drawn from the
beginning of “Book III,” a section in which Augustine is recounting his past sexual desires:
I went to Carthage, where I found myself in the midst of a hissing cauldron of lust. I had
not yet fallen in love, but I was in love with the idea of it, and this feeling that something
was missing made me despise myself for not being more anxious to satisfy the need. I
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began to look around for some objects for my love, since I wanted to love something. I
had no liking for the safe path without pitfalls, for although my real need was for you, my
God, who are the food of the soul, I was not aware of this hunger. (55)
Augustine claims he was not “in love,” but was “in love with the idea of” love, identifying the
object of desire to be desire itself. Augustine recounts going to Carthage from the retrospective
place of recognizing his “real need” for God, spurring the question of what the monostich, “To
Carthage then I came,” is doing at the end of the section. The syntax of “To Carthage then I
came” creates a sense of temporal disorientation: Is the weight of “going to Carthage” currently
occurring, or is it retrospectively recounted? The temporality of the statement alters whether or
not the poem is in the throes of the “hissing cauldron of lust,” or if “Carthage” is invoked as a
symbol of self-conscious reckoning with the hollowness of carnality as a “shrinking of desire.”
Augustine’s statement at the beginning of “Book III” identifies, however, the “real need” for
God. An inversion of Freud’s theory of the sublimation of the libido, Augustine identifies his
sense that “something was missing” because his “hunger” and “real need” for God was clouded
by fleeting, material desires.
The Buddha’s voice is interspersed with Augustine’ with lines like “burning burning
burning.” As the section of the poem is named after the Buddha’s “Fire Sermon,” the cleansing
of distracting sensual desire looms over the whole exchange between the young man carbuncular
and the typist. Their actions, despite appearing morally vacuous, are moralized by their
proximity to sacred, ascetic texts. A section of the actual sermon that Eliot is drawing on reads,
“All things, O priests, are on fire [...] The eye, O priests, is on fire; forms are on fire: eyeconsciousness is on fire; impressions received by the eye are on fire; and whatever sensations,
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pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent [...] that also is on fire.”8 The Buddha is here preaching about
extinguishing all sensual desires in order to liberate oneself from suffering, yet if the young man
carbuncular and the typist are emblems of what is attempting to be cleansed, they are
nonetheless, present. The tension between the the young man carbuncular’s desire and the
Buddha’s call for an extinguishment of desire dramatizes the struggle of The Waste Land, but
their juxtaposition begets a new whole. The tension is an act of passing through “two or more
discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall somehow include and transmute them” (KE, 362).
Neither viewpoints are entirely shed in their interaction, but through negation, they gesture
towards something other.
In his “Notes to the Waste Land,” Eliot claims that he chose to put Confessions and “The
Fire Sermon” in dialogue with each other because they are “representatives of eastern and
western asceticism.” Both texts are marked by a sufferance in the pursuit of re-ordering desires
towards proper ends, despite the ends being drastically different. Augustine’s voice and the
Buddha’s voice function as beacons amidst the moral disarray of the poem’s other voices; but
they are also emblems of the entire project of The Waste Land itself. The ascetic practice must
necessarily remain a “struggle” in order for it to be ascetic. Between the emergence of Augustine
and the emergence of the Buddha amidst the disparate voices deprived of a moral framework, the
apophasis of the poem is both striving towards something that is not able to be articulated within
the poem’s own limits, while also being involved in the continual act of renunciation. Its
renunciations, however, are not yet resolved and it is thereby, in Eliot’s own words, a “struggle.”
There is the sense that, though not positively stated, an expansive desire lurks beneath the
poem’s surface, beneath the fragmented allusions, and the multiple voices; a desire for a form of
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Eliot cited Henry Clark Warren’s Buddhism in Translation in his “Notes to the Waste Land.”.
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“unification” that is not communicated in Eliot’s early criticism. Augustine’s claim to “descend,
that ye may ascend” and the Buddha’s urge to eliminate desires are both at work in the whole
structural pursuit of The Waste Land. Martha Nussbaum writes on the Platonic Christian tradition
of “ascension” as the “consequence of this perceived tension between love’s energy for good and
its subversive power” in order to “reform or educate erotic love” (469). The ascension hinges on
the recognition of a capriciousness in “love” and desire; their potential for good is conditional to
the object it is attached to. She continues: “The aspiring lover climbs a ladder from the quotidian
love from which she began, with all its difficulties, to an allegedly higher and more truly
fulfilling love.” The Waste Land is, in many ways, a step on such a ladder towards a “higher and
more truly fulfilling love.”
***
The apophatic discourse of The Waste Land is a poetic meditation on the metaphysics of
desire. A type of ascent, the constellation of voices I traced in the previous section provide some
sense of order to desire through cataloguing material desire’s disorder. The poem’s multivocality is an investigation in how to orient desire to an object that is satiable in its insatiability,
but further, how to orient desire toward an object that is fundamentally unknowable. The
asceticism of The Waste Land is thus an exercise in humility. It is in this context that Eliot wrote
on The Waste Land: “Only those who talk of discipline may have looked into the Abyss”
(Kearns, 196). The apophatic discourse of the poem is an effort towards disciplining desire, and
it is is thereby a method of approaching the “Abyss.” It does not purport to know, but the method
of apophasis probes it. The Apostle Paul said: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then
face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known” (Corinth.
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13:12). The Waste Land is an effort in looking into the “Abyss” under the preconditions that all
glimpses of it are seen “through a glass darkly.”
One form of contending with the “Abyss” is the recurring usage of memento moris,
giving voice to the mystery of what occurs to desire post-mortem. If we are to understand death
as the eclipse of secular desire in the absence of an eschatological union with the eternal, the
memento moris in The Waste Land are brute materiality. However, if we are to consider religious
desire, the promise of some half-seen satiation in death, the memento moris can connote more
than just the end of life. Positioned at the threshold of the temporal and the eternal, the memento
moris are a material semblance of what desire, religious or secular, can beget. A frantic voice in
“Burial of the Dead” asks someone if “That corpse you planted last year in your garden, ‘Has it
begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?” The image of the corpse as fertilizer parodies
Whitman’s “Song of Myself” in which the “Leaves of Grass” are recognized as “the beautiful
uncut hair of graves” (193). In contrast to Whitman’s loaded metaphor of grass as both the
“handkerchief of God” and the “flag of his disposition,” the deployment of the inquiring voice
darkly satirizes the Whitmanian image in the speaker’s exclamation of “O keep the Dog far
hence, that’s friend to men, / Or with his nails he’ll dig it up again!” Eliot is here mocking
Whitman’s pantheistic concept of God as an immanent; apart of all of the material world and the
self. In contrast to grass as the “hair of graves,” the grave is here not even able to “sprout.” There
is a sense in which this voice desperately attempts to take on the Whitmanian disposition, but
comically is unable to because a dog will “dig [the corpse] up again” and squander any
possibility for the remains of death to engender life.
In a different voice and a different mood, the Phoenician sailor’s bones in “Fear Death by
Water” provide another form of the memento mori. “A current under the sea / Picked up his
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bones in whispers. As he rose and fell / He passed the stages of his age and youth.” The voice
points out that in death, the sailor has forgotten “the cry of the gulls, and the deep sea swell / And
the profit and the loss.” As sensory memories of the sea dissipate in death, so does all “profit and
loss”; the facts, experiences, and emotions of life are thus reduced to a pile of bones. The total of
one’s “age and youth” are at once lost and fully comprehended in the, what Eliot earlier called,
“Abyss” that is death. All movements forwards and backwards, all engagements in “memory”
and “desire” are ultimately subject to perish. Rather than being inert and dug up by a dog,
Plebas’s bones “rose and fell” with the drift of the sea. Eliot is drawing on deep-seated literary
associations of the sea with faith: Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” represents the receding tides
as the fading “Sea of Faith.” The immensity of the ocean as Phlebas’ burial ground is far more
contemplative and far more life-giving, even in the imperative to “Fear Death by Water,” than
the comic inability to use a corpse as fertilizer.
Phlebas’s memento mori functions very literally under its etymological pretenses to
“remember death”: “Consider Phlebas, who was once handsome and tall as you.” In the voice’s
plea for consideration comes a quietness, something starkly different from the mania of the
previously mentioned scene. The voice does not ask the reader to know, but merely to
“consider.” The human is not here seen as attempting to instigate the cycle of life, or even assert
any kind of dominion over death, but Phlebas is merely subject to “death” and “fear.” The usage
of the memento mori is one such example in which the voices make a clearing for the potential
of other-worldliness, but the images associated with the recurring language of “fear” provides
another glimpse into the “Abyss.”
The Waste Land is, on the whole, unable to state its objects of desire - not because they
are necessarily unknown, but because it is aware that the objects themselves may be
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fundamentally unknowable in this life. There are, however, moments in which a voice of the
apophatic discourse will, in its self-assured resemblance to religious language and paradigms, be
suggestive of a more foundational, dominant thread of thought coursing through the poem,
underlying all the images of debased desires. The memento moris provide oblique glimpses
beyond the images of this-worldly desire, but they are nonetheless formulated in materialistic
terms. This is, after all, the linguistic and moral paradigm that the poem has access to while
striving after another. Another voice, however, following that of Marie in “The Burial of the
Dead” marks a distinct tonal shift from any of the other voices in the poem. He claims that he
will “show you something different,” suggesting that there is something lurking beyond the
poem’s dermal layers of secular desire:
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only
There is shadow under this red rock,
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),
And I will show you something different from either
Your shadow at morning striding behind you
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you:
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.
The image of desert dryness recurs throughout Eliot’s literary career, working within his own
self-referential idiomatic tradition. It recalls the overwhelming desiccation and incurable
despondency in the world of “Gerontion,” as well as the pleasure in being parched in the first
seven lines of the poem. Considering desert imagery was used to express the desolation of
“Gerontion,” the landscape’s infertility in which no “branches grow / Out of this stony rubbish”
may be read synonymously with a dehydrated moral, but despite using the same imagery, it is
doing something radically different here.
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As “Son of man” is an expression in the sayings of Christ, its deployment as apostrophe
in this stanza accrues biblical meaning. The voice channels fraught associations of the desert as
the primary site for spiritual “struggle.” After he was baptized by John the Baptist, “Then was
Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil” (Matthew, 4:1). The
temptation of Christ in the wilderness epitomizes some of the very struggles occuring in The
Waste Land: Christ is offered a variety of objects, but renounces their temptation and thereby
renounces the worldly desires they represent. The wilderness, or the desert, is the setting of
Christ’s temptation, and it is the setting for the apophasis of The Waste Land. The multi-vocal
structure of the poem poses a variety of different temptations, offering glimpses into alternate
desires, but none of them are indulged as absolute. In contrast with the dread of aridity in
“Gerontion,” this moment in The Waste Land converts aridity into a positive vision; something
that is contingent upon an ascetic orientation to the material world.
The semiotics of the desert landscape exaggerate the speaker’s claims, placing them into
a wider devotional dialogue beyond the temporal perimeters of the poem. Directly addressing the
reader as “Son of man,” the voice says, “You cannot say, or guess, for you know only / A heap
of broken images.” The “heap of broken images” harkens back to a phraseology in “Gerontion,”
in which Gerontion addresses the state of the self, history, and culture as whirled “fractured
atoms.” They are present, but isolated and un-integrated. While Gerontion resigned to the sense
the “chilled delirium” in his miserable problem of a perhaps unanswerable question, “After such
knowledge, what forgiveness?”, the voice of this stanza possesses a vastly different sense of
man’s accessibility to knowledge. For Gerontion, the object of his failing desires resides
somewhere in the “cunning passages” of history, and the “fractured atoms” are an emblem of his
broken surroundings. In contrast, however, the “heap of broken images” in The Waste Land
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refers to the totality of all that man is unable to access - not merely the cultural. It is a radical
acknowledgement of man’s inability to find total coherence in the “broken images” of the
physical world, and a looming sense that there is more beyond them - perhaps even a unification.
There is little that man can “say” or “guess” because his knowledge is limited to the chaos and
disorder of the material world.
The whole structure of the poem is arguably a “heap of broken images,” but behind the
brokenness is a semblance of unification. Gavin Flood wrote: “The ultimate goal of Christian
asceticism has been the reconstitution of the pre-fall state through withdrawal and self-mastery”
(145). As man’s knowledge is limited to these “broken images,” what is it exactly that he
“cannot say, or guess”? The whole goal of the Christian ascetic is to induce a return to the
prelapsarian through the discipline of “withdrawal and self-mastery,” which in a sense, is exactly
what the reader of The Waste Land is inundated into through its apophatic structure. Eliot’s own
“struggle toward unification” in “The Metaphysical Poets” places desire in the temporal world;
however, the form of “unification” that is attempted in The Waste Land approaches transcendent
unification; that of, in Flood’s words, the “pre-Fall.” The poem is fundamentally sustained by its
own ascetic impulses, its humility to not assert knowledge over its objects, and its
acknowledgement that it fundamentally cannot state a single, comprehensively true point of
view.
The voice of the stanza claims: “I will show you something different from either / Your
shadow at morning striding behind you / Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you.” The
temporal thrust of secular “memory” and “desire” invoked in the first stanza is here mirrored and
spatialized by the “shadow at morning striding behind you” and the “shadow at evening rising to
meet you.” Memory projects the consciousness backwards in time, while desire projects
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consciousness forward into the future. Dictated by the diurnal cycle, “memory” and “desire”
appear and disappear like clock-work in the morning and evening. The temporal thrust of these
shadows addresses the liminality of temporal life. The shadows spatialize “memory” and
“desire,” giving them a material timeline, but the individual is constantly wading in their
shadows. Considering Goodheart’s concept of “illimitable desire” and Durkheim’s concepts of
anomic desire as “constantly renewed torture,” the continual emergence of the shadows is similar
how secular desire behaves. The secular form of desire represented in the shadow metaphor does
not have an ultimate object; it is fractured and transitory, attaching itself to disparate desires and
memories that continuously recur with the rising and setting sun. It is constantly involved in a
cycle of emergence and retreat. In these constant extensions of “memory” and “desire,” the
shadows envelop the individual. To drown in the shadows of temporalized “memory” and
“desire” is to become subject to their potential for tyranny. The problem is, however, that the
bridge between the shadows and the “you” is never sufficiently put into union: they are always
either “striding” or “rising.” This is not terribly disparate from the argument I make in my first
chapter on why Eliot’s whole project of re-association does not have a correlating object. In the
absence of a single, meaningful object of desire, the project for re-association is simply too vast,
too expansive for the integrative impulse to make any form of satiation intelligible.
This voice of prophecy, however, claims he will show us “something different.”
Following the voices’ statements on what he will not show us, he positively claims, “I will show
you fear in a handful of dust.” The texture in a “handful of dust” parallels the “heap of broken
images” stated a few lines earlier. The “dust,” however, is imbued with religious meaning that is
absent in the deeply materialistic “broken images.” Considering the entire structure of The Waste
Land is an apophatic discourse, an exercise in the disciplining of desire, the closest symbolic
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glimpse into the unknowable “Abyss” is “fear in a handful of dust.” In the book of Genesis, God
punished mankind with mortality after they ate from the tree: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou
eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and
unto dust shalt thou return” (Gen. 3:19). As Adam and Eve’s progenitors, Eliot invokes the
lineage of mankind’s sin, as well as his finitude. The whole of human life, all birth and death, are
comprehended in the image of “dust”: “for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.” The
corpse as fertilizer near the end of the “Burial of the Dead” was an act attempting to emulate the
cyclicality of dust in Genesis, but, like the other apophatic voices demonstrating debased desires,
it was ultimately thwarted.
The “fear in a handful of dust,” however, gives the “Abyss” that Eliot identifies as The
Waste Land its fullest symbolic expression. It is, in many ways, the consummate image of the
poem: it is what is purported to be “shown” to us, not told. The “fear in a handful of dust,” as
opposed to the other memento moris throughout the poem, is sacramental. It is a visible symbol
of the spiritual realities that are reckoned with throughout the space of the poem, as well as an
admittance of man’s ability to know precisely what occurs after and before the “dust.” It is
evocative of time on earth, while gesturing towards what occurs after: “Oh how great is thy
goodness, which thou hast laid up for them that fear thee; which thou hast wrought for them that
trust in thee before the sons of men!” (Psalm 31:19). Fear may be interpreted as simply fear of
nothingness, but nothingness is not synonymous with the “Abyss.” Fear is a devotional emotion;
deeply entwined with what God “hast wrought for” humanity after death. This moment suggests
that desire post-mortem does not eclipse, but, in Eliot’s words, “expands” (CL, 660).
The Waste Land was written before Eliot’s conversion to Anglo-Catholicism, but it is
“struggle” and a step towards the formation of Eliot’s religious sensibility. The ascetic discipline
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of the poem is ultimately in the throes of its own struggles toward giving discipline to desire. The
“unification of sensibility” (MP) that he established in his early critical prose takes on an
explicitly spiritual valence in The Waste Land, attempting to approach a “unification” with that
which is beyond the tangible, the knowable, and the human. In its transition to the religious
imaginary, Eliot’s desire is not merely to see “through the glass,” but it is aware of its own
limits; aware that all attempts are seen “darkly.”
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Conclusion
––––––––––––––––––

Towards an Interpretation of Ash Wednesday and Four Quartets

Terminate torment
Of love unsatisfied
The greater torment
Of love satisfied
Ash-Wednesday

By the time Eliot converted to Anglo-Catholicism, or by the time he had latched onto a
cohesive metaphysics of desire, he found “love satisfied” to be “the greater torment.” Only
desires of the secular imagination can be “satisfied.” They are, however, fundamentally
unfulfilling and thus, as Durkheim stated, “constantly renewed torture.” Love, regardless of its
satisfaction, is characterized by torment for Eliot. The “greater torment” attached to the love
“satisfied,” however, lacks a comprehensive cosmology and a robust moral framework. Its
“greater torment” is deprived of a grander meaning.
To recall Eliot’s letter to Paul Elmore More: He claimed religion brought him “something
above morals, and therefore extremely terrifying; it has brought me not happiness but a sense of
something above happiness and therefore more terrifying than ordinary pain and misery; the very
dark night and the desert.” The “torment” Eliot is here entertaining is beyond secular categories
of emotion; Eliot lodges himself within a larger tradition of Christian suffering and ascetic
practice, thereby placing himself in closer proximity to thinkers like Augustine and St. John of
the Cross than that of his contemporaries, like William Carlos Williams and Ford Madox Ford.
By the time Eliot was writing Ash Wednesday and the Four Quartets, he was writing in kairotic
time rather than chronological time. Charles Taylor defined the kairotic: “the time line
encounters kairotic knots, moments whose nature and placing calls for reversals” (54). Eliot’s
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relationship to “torment” transcends the bounds of linearity, allowing him to be in direct
conversation with both a wider ascetic tradition and the transcendent.
In some respects, Eliot’s religious instinct allowed him to perform what other modernists
were attempting with temporality. He was able to do access kairotic time, the emotional intensity
that gives way to momentary collapses of linearity. He did this, however, not just through his
poetics, but through his entire metaphysical system of desire and his religious cosmology. The
French philosopher Henri Bergson wrote extensively on the modern experience of temporality.
He was primarily concerned with the capacity for standardized hours, similar to Benjamin’s
concept of homogenized time, to dissect experience into mere segments. By establishing “true
duration” in diametric opposition with the duration that time-keeping mechanisms enact, he
imagined time to be based in the intensity of experience and memory. Bergson’s polemic against
empty time is in part a reification of the individual against the mechanization of industrial
concepts of time, imagining exercises of pure intellect and rationality to be an assault against
more fluid conscious states. The narrativity of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, for example,
follows the structure, or perhaps lack thereof, of consciousness through the intensity of sensation
and emotion. This is a feat restricted to the realm of poetics. Its own object of contemplation is a
break from the chronos. In contrast, Eliot’s ability to break from the chronological, by the time
he was writing his later works, was necessarily symptomatic of his other spiritual objects of
contemplation. Eliot’s relationship to religion allowed for “reversals” and “knots” (Taylor) in
time’s linearity both through poetic structure, but also through a more enveloping, immersive
religious instinct.
While desire is a spatio-temporal structure, contingent upon its object and where it is
located, religious desire allowed Eliot to break from the confines of desire as an ever-receding
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horizon line. Visions of desire course through Eliot’s thought, but their objects are relational to
his ontological orientation. The struggle in the formation of Eliot’s religious sensibility can be
traced through the images Eliot uses in his poems. Eliot gravitates towards the same symbols, but
their evolution alters depending on context. For example, the consummate image of The Waste
Land, “fear in a handful of dust,” is loudly echoed in Ash Wednesday. “Fear” and “dust” are what
is “shown” to us in The Waste Land. It is what is being spoken away from through apophatic
circumvention, but Ash Wednesday and Four Quartets directly speaks to, or on: “Wherefore I
abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:6). Job, like many other figures of the bible,
uses dust and ashes as the visual symbol of repentance. Ash Wednesday is also the first day of
Lent in the liturgical calendar, marking the services of penitence. What is contained in the “fear
in a handful of dust” is thus given life and expanded upon in Ash Wednesday. The poem is a
devotional document fully reckoning with the conversion, and at the same time, reckoning with
the reconciliation of secular desire and religious desire. It is a document coming into the
knowledge, and thus the renunciation, of “the greater torment.”
I initially began this process with an interest in writing on the Four Quartets, and this is
where I would like to end it. A section of the final stanza of “Burnt Norton” reads:
Desire itself is movement
Not in itself desirable;
Love is itself unmoving,
Only the cause and end of movement,
Timeless, and undesiring
Except in the aspect of time
Caught in the form of limitation
Between un-being and being.
Eliot reads desire as “movement,” or expansion. As opposed to the digestion of desires in the
previous line, “Distraction from distraction by distraction,” desire is in constant motion. It is not
static, and further it is not an object to be sought after. The promise of pleasure latent in desire is
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what Augustine attributes to leading to his “unholy loves” in Confessions, but Eliot here posits
desire as an external reality that cannot be its own object. “Love” may stir the emotions and be
moving, but the “Love” Eliot is here speaking on possesses its own reality. It is not a love of the
emotions or a love subject to what Eliot identifies as “psychologism” (CL), but it is a constant,
“unmoving” metaphysical reality. It exists with or without the presence of humanity. As Eliot
wrote in Seconds Thoughts about Humanism, the human is able to recognize “Love” as a
supernatural reality, but the human is not the ultimate center of “Love,” and thus his own loves
and desires are not the ultimate center, either.
For Eliot, the human is “Caught in the form of limitation / Between un-being and being.”
Recalling the shadows of “memory” and “desire” in The Waste Land, Eliot renders temporal
time a “limitation.” It is, however, a step, and not the final one. Eliot prods at the limits of the
phenomenal world, while recognizing that material life exists between “un-being and being,” and
is thereby not fully knowable. He positions the greater “Love” above temporality; it is
“timeless,” caught in the interaction between the temporal and the eternal. This moment of
entrapment is what is accessible to the material: it is the “fear in a handful of dust” (The Waste
Land). In the same manner that Eliot conceived of his religious sensibility as constantly
evolving, I would like to think of my relationship to Eliot doing the same. I have found that my
relationship to the Quartets changed every time I engage them, and perhaps, like the objects
Eliot is striving after, his own words are inexhaustible, as well. I am thinking of this project as a
step.
Unlike the apophatic discourse of The Waste Land, the “struggle” Eliot articulates in his
letter to Heller is not resolved in the Four Quartets, but it is given another life. It is, in some
sense, another step on a set of stairs. The formation of Eliot’s religious sensibility allowed him to
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engage in a form of desire that is fundamentally inexhaustible. Desire is not merely an emotion,
but a metaphysical energy that became sacramental. What does it mean for the strivances
towards the unmovable “Love” Eliot refers to in “Burnt Norton” to have no attainable telos?
Desire is indeterminate, but in channeling it into something beyond the material world, Eliot
gives meaning to its “torment” (Ash Wednesday). I do not mean to say that religion, for Eliot,
was instrumental to gaining a sense of solace from the suffering of secular desire, but religion
provided Eliot with an order and system of meaning that was not found in the “immanent frame”
(Taylor).
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